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BENEFIT CORPORATIONS AND THE SEPARATION OF 
BENEFIT AND CONTROL  
Emily Winston† 
Scholars, activists, and other observers have expressed concern about the social 
effects of corporate activity in the United States since as early as the nineteenth 
century. A recurring theme in this debate has been whether corporations’ focus on 
shareholder interests causes them to neglect and harm the interests of other 
constituencies affected by corporate activity. A recent and prominent effort to address 
this concern is the social enterprise movement, which is unique because it has 
resulted in the creation of entirely new business entities designed specifically for for-
profit businesses devoted to pursuing social missions. One of the most widely adopted 
products of this social enterprise movement is the benefit corporation. 
Benefit corporations aim to liberate businesses to do more social good by 
freeing management from a narrow focus on shareholder value. Scholars have 
written with restrained hope about benefit corporations, pointing out weaknesses 
that may inhibit benefit corporations’ ability to produce meaningful social returns 
and highlighting the fact that shareholder primacy is not required under traditional 
corporate law. Nonetheless, the social enterprise movement exists because modern 
corporations are generally governed with a narrow focus on share price, even if there 
is no clear legal mandate to do so. 
This Article evaluates the potential success of benefit corporations in light of the 
absence of a legal mandate to prioritize shareholder interests. First, it analyzes the 
forces that have led traditional corporations to become narrowly focused on share 
price maximization. It then systematically evaluates (1) whether benefit corporations 
will be vulnerable to these forces; and (2) whether benefit corporations will succeed in 
producing social benefits. By repurposing the traditional agency cost analysis of 
corporate governance, it concludes that substantial impediments to meaningful social 
return remain because the beneficiaries of benefit corporations’ social missions have 
no rights to influence corporate decision making—the “separation of benefit and 
control.” Finally, it proposes an ex ante Public Benefit Plan, drafted by the benefit 
 
 †  Jacobson Fellow in Law and Business, NYU School of Law. I am very grateful to 
Professor Helen Scott for her extensive support and feedback on this Article. I also owe 
substantial gratitude to Professor Dana Brakman Reiser, Rob Esposito, Naveen Thomas, and 
the participants in the NYU Lawyering Scholarship Colloquium and the National Business Law 
Scholars Conference for very helpful comments and conversations. All errors are my own. 
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corporation and its intended beneficiaries, as a solution to the separation of benefit 
and control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Concern about the social effects of corporations has a long history 
in the United States, dating at least as far back as the nineteenth century 
when states began granting corporate shareholders limited liability.1 A 
more modern debate about the social effects of corporations arose at the 
start of the twentieth century, when the trend toward public ownership 
of corporations began.2 The contours of the arguments of those 
pursuing greater corporate social responsibility have varied over time. 
Nonetheless, while the details may have shifted, the general theme of 
this concern has persisted: large corporations’ focus on pleasing their 
shareholders may cause harm to others affected by their actions.3 In 
spite of the nearly century-long history of this debate, it was not until 
the recent “social enterprise” movement that legislatures began to 
amend state corporation law to provide a governance framework 
specifically designed to make corporations more accountable to the 
public.4 
In the early part of the twenty-first century, in the wake of large 
corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, followed by the 2008 
financial crisis, a large constituency of entrepreneurs has arisen who 
aspire to run profitable businesses that produce a positive social 
impact.5 Proponents of this movement define the term “social 
enterprise” in more than one way, but in this Article it refers broadly to 
recent efforts to develop for-profit businesses capable of doing more 
social good and less social harm than corporations have done in the 
past. 
In response to this social enterprise movement, states across the 
United States have passed legislation enabling special business entity 
forms that are designed specifically to allow and require these for-profit 
businesses to pursue social goals. Substantial legal innovation has 
occurred in this area, and several business forms have been designed 
and implemented by drawing heavily on existing legal forms, such as 
corporations and limited liability companies, but with modifications 
 
 1 See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 34–35 (1976). 
 2 See C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical 
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 84 (2002). 
 3 Id. at 78. 
 4 See Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate 
Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974, 990 (2013) (“[T]oday, for the first time since the late 
nineteenth century, the corporate governance realm itself has been used by state law to address 
the larger issue of corporate responsibility.”). 
 5 Many social enterprises pursue environmental goals, which are sometimes referenced as 
a separate concept from social goals, likely because the target of the goal is not human. For 
simplicity, this Article will use the term “social” when referring to goals, benefits, and related 
concepts, to mean benefits to people, animals, and the environment. 
1786 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 39:1783 
intended to enable and require the businesses to pursue social goals. 
Among these new business entity forms, the one that has been most 
widely adopted by state legislatures and chosen by businesses is the 
benefit corporation.6 
The first legislation enabling the formation of a benefit corporation 
was passed in 2010, and the benefit corporation is currently available as 
a business entity choice in thirty-four states and Washington, D.C.7 The 
stated goal of benefit corporation legislation is to “authorize[] the 
organization of a form of business corporation . . . that operates with a 
corporate purpose broader than maximizing shareholder value and that 
consciously undertakes a responsibility to maximize the benefits of its 
operations for all stakeholders, not just shareholders.”8 
Many entrepreneurs starting new businesses are choosing the 
benefit corporation form, and a number of existing socially minded 
businesses have converted to benefit corporations.9 Because the benefit 
 
 6 Status Tool: All, SOC. ENTERPRISE L. TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/#/map (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2018) (showing benefit corporation legislation enacted in thirty-one states and 
Washington, D.C. as of 2017; low-profit limited liability company legislation enacted in eight 
states; social purpose corporation legislation enacted in four states; and benefit limited liability 
company legislation enacted in three states). B Lab has tallied 5385 registered benefit 
corporations, noting that the list is incomplete because not all states track the names and 
number of benefit corporations. Find a Benefit Corp, B LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/
find-a-benefit-corp?field_bcorp_certified_value=&state=&title=&submit2=Go&sort_by=title&
sort_order=ASC&op=Go (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
 7 State by State Status of Legislation, B LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-
state-status (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
 8 MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION: WITH EXPLANATORY COMMENTS § 101 
cmt. (Apr. 17, 2017) [hereinafter MODEL LEGISLATION], http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf. 
 9 Danone, a multinational French corporation, acquired the U.S. organic food producer 
WhiteWave for $10.4 billion in 2016 and subsequently converted the acquisition to a benefit 
corporation named DanoneWave. It is now the largest benefit corporation in the United States. 
Leon Kaye, Newly Merged DanoneWave Now the Largest U.S. Public Benefit Corporation, 
TRIPLEPUNDIT (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.triplepundit.com/2017/04/newly-merged-
danonewave-now-largest-u-s-public-benefit-corporation. Patagonia, an environmentally 
conscious outdoor clothing retailer, converted to a benefit corporation once benefit corporation 
legislation was available in California. Mat McDermott, Patagonia Becomes a California Benefit 
Corporation, TREEHUGGER (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/
patagonia-becomes-california-benefit-corporation.html. Kickstarter, a fundraising platform for 
creative projects, converted to a Delaware Public Benefit Corporation in 2015. Yancey Strickler 
et al., Kickstarter Is Now a Benefit Corporation, KICKSTARTER: THE KICKSTARTER BLOG (Sept. 
21, 2015), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-is-now-a-benefit-corporation. 
CiviCore, a technology company serving the nonprofit and public sectors, converted from a 
Limited Liability Company (LLC) to a Delaware Public Benefit Corporation in January 2017. 
CiviCore, CiviCore Becomes a Public Benefit Corporation, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 17, 2017, 8:40 
AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/civicore-becomes-a-public-benefit-
corporation-300391285.html. Philadelphia Media Network, the holding company for The 
Philadelphia Inquirer and other news outlets, converted to a Delaware Public Benefit 
Corporation in January 2016. Elizabeth K. Babson & Robert T. Esposito, The Year in Social 
Enterprise: 2016 Legislative and Policy Review, DRINKERBIDDLE (Feb. 7, 2017), http://
www.drinkerbiddle.com/insights/publications/2017/02/the-year-in-social-enterprise. Virginia 
Community Capital, a community-based bank, converted to a Virginia Benefit Corporation in 
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corporation is a potential solution to a long-standing concern and is in 
high demand among socially minded business leaders, it is worthwhile 
to closely examine its potential strengths and weaknesses to increase the 
likelihood that it endures and flourishes as a vehicle for socially 
responsible business. 
Benefit corporations are still too new for any reliable evaluation of 
their success in practice.10 Nonetheless, since the enactment of the first 
benefit corporation legislation in Maryland in 2010, scholars have 
evaluated this new corporate form’s potential with restrained hope, 
pointing out perceived deficiencies that may hamper benefit 
corporations’ effective pursuit of their social missions.11 In doing so, 
several scholars have highlighted that benefit corporations’ focus on 
permitting managers to consider the interests of non-shareholder 
stakeholders is unnecessary, noting that shareholder value maximization 
is not legally required for traditional corporations.12 Nonetheless, 
observers generally agree that modern corporations are currently 
governed for the benefit of their shareholders, even if there is no clear 
legal mandate that they do so.13 As will be discussed herein, the focus of 
modern corporations tends to be, more specifically, maximization of 
share price rather than shareholder value more generally, and it is this 
more specific tendency that benefit corporations strive to overcome. 
This Article evaluates the potential success of benefit corporations 
in light of the absence of a legal mandate to prioritize shareholder 
interests or share price. First, it analyzes the forces that have led 
 
April 2016, becoming the first regulated bank to do so. VCC: America’s First Benefit 
Corporation Bank, VCC (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.vacommunitycapital.org/news/2016/04/03/
vcc-americas-first-benefit-corporation-bank. 
 10 See DANA BRAKMAN REISER & STEVEN A. DEAN, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW: TRUST, PUBLIC 
BENEFIT AND CAPITAL MARKETS 52 (2017) (“The first-generation hybrid forms remain too 
novel for empirical study of their uptake to be reliable . . . .”). 
 11 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—a Sustainable Form of 
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 624 (2011) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Benefit 
Corporations] (“Leaving all content to unregulated standard-setters and providing little 
guidance or enforcement apparatus for midstream decision making, however, does not do 
enough to ensure benefit corporations can enforce a dual mission over time.”); J. Haskell 
Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 26 (2015) (“Data from early 
benefit corporations shows an abysmal benefit report compliance rate (below ten percent), 
drawing into question the claims about heightened transparency.”); Alicia E. Plerhoples, 
Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity Through Public Benefit Corporations, 21 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 525, 526 (2017) (“[T]he more pernicious harm is that ‘market-based 
charity’ injects individualistic and autocratic business values and methods into charitable 
work.”). 
 12 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 
681, 686–88 (2013) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making 
It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 248–49 (2014). 
 13 See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 3 (2012); Edward B. Rock, Adapting 
to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1910 (2013); Brakman Reiser, 
Benefit Corporations, supra note 11, at 591; Strine, Jr., supra note 12, at 241–42. 
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traditional corporations to become narrowly focused on share price 
maximization, concluding that the current composition of share 
ownership combines with other external factors to empower 
shareholders to effectively advocate for share price maximization, but 
not other shareholder interests. Then, by repurposing the traditional 
agency cost analysis of corporate governance for the benefit corporation 
form, it concludes that substantial impediments to providing 
meaningful social returns remain due to the “separation of benefit and 
control.” That is, the intended beneficiaries of benefit corporations’ 
social missions have no authority to impact corporate decision making 
and enforce commitment to social mission. With this framework in 
place, it then systematically evaluates: (1) whether the benefit 
corporation form will be vulnerable to the pressures that have driven 
traditional corporations towards share price maximization, and (2) 
whether it will succeed in pursuing and producing social benefits, in 
light of the separation of benefit and control. The result of this analysis 
is pessimistic because managers and shareholders—the groups tasked 
with pursuing and enforcing social mission—are faced with the 
competing incentive of profit maximization. Whether intentionally or 
not, it is substantially likely that benefit corporation managers’ and 
shareholders’ ability to produce meaningful social good will not live up 
to expectations. 
This Article concludes that the weaknesses caused by the 
separation of benefit and control will not be adequately overcome 
without engaging beneficiaries directly in the pursuit and enforcement 
of benefit corporations’ social missions. Finally, it proposes as a 
potential solution for further discussion a requirement that beneficiaries 
be involved in creating and monitoring a “Public Benefit Plan” as a 
means to overcome the separation of benefit and control. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly summarizes the 
history of debate and advocacy for increased corporate social 
responsibility, up to and including the current social enterprise 
movement. Part II describes the legal structure and goals of benefit 
corporations. Part III traces the theoretical origins of the normative 
view that corporations should be governed for the benefit of their 
shareholders. It then describes the forces that have driven modern 
corporate governance to be narrowly focused on share price. Part IV 
uses the theoretical framework traditionally associated with shareholder 
primacy to describe a major obstacle that benefit corporations will face 
in effectively pursuing social missions—the lack of beneficiary rights. It 
then recounts the forces that have driven corporate governance toward 
shareholder primacy and analyzes the effects those forces will have on 
benefit corporation governance. Part V proposes a “Public Benefit 
Plan,” jointly created and monitored by the benefit corporation and its 
intended beneficiaries, as a potential solution to the challenges 
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identified herein. 
I.     HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO SOCIAL HARM CAUSED BY BUSINESSES 
In the nineteenth century, state governments began the trend of 
limiting the liability of corporate shareholders to encourage 
incorporations because these governments believed corporations 
contributed great social utility to the U.S. economy.14 This gave rise to 
one of the earliest debates over the social effects of corporations because 
protecting shareholders from personal liability for the corporation’s 
debts disadvantaged creditors, and was viewed by many as 
undemocratic because this financial protection was unique to 
shareholders and not enjoyed by other corporate stakeholders.15 
Since then, large U.S. corporations have grown steadily in both 
their size and their influence on the lives of both Americans and others 
around the world. During this time, scholars have pointed out the great 
economic success of U.S. corporations and argued that it is socially 
desirable for corporations to be managed for the benefit of their 
shareholders.16 However, throughout this century of ascent for the U.S. 
corporation and its shareholders, a contingent of scholars and 
commentators have consistently expressed concern about the effects of 
shareholder primacy on the corporation’s other “stakeholders.” Relevant 
stakeholders include the corporation’s employees, customers, and 
members of the community in which it does business.17 Concern about 
the effects of corporate activities on these other stakeholder groups can 
be generally referred to as concern about corporate social 
responsibility.18 
Since the modern debates about corporate social responsibility 
beginning around 1930, the details of concerns about corporate social 
responsibility have varied in reaction to changing trends in corporate 
activity. However, certain aspects of the argument in favor of greater 
social responsibility have remained constant. The recurring theme, as 
described by Professor C.A. Harwell Wells, has consistently been 
 
 14 See NADER ET AL., supra note 1, at 63. 
 15 See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Limited Liability in Historical Perspective, 4 AM. BUS. L. 
ASS’N BULL. 11, 15–16 (1960), http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/resources/abla/abld_
4.1.11-33.pdf (“[T]he granting of corporate privilege, with limited liability, was itself considered 
to be a type of monopoly, by way of legal privilege if not by way of trade or product, that was 
anti-democratic in nature. If the small, unincorporated businessman was subject to total 
financial ruin in a business failure, the argument ran, why should the corporate stockholder be 
exempt from the same risk?” (citing Child v. Boston & Fairhaven Iron Works, 137 Mass. 516 
(Mass. 1884))). 
 16 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 112 (1962). 
 17 See Wells, supra note 2, at 78. 
 18 Id. 
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“whether the directors and managers of large, publicly held corporations 
should have a legal duty, when making decisions for the corporation, to 
take into account not only the needs of the shareholders but also other 
[stakeholders] . . . .”19 The remainder of this Part traces the history of the 
modern debate over corporate social responsibility in the United States 
up to and including the current social enterprise movement. 
A.     Prior to Current Movement 
The modern debates over corporate social responsibility were 
inspired by the changing nature of corporations and the laws governing 
them at the turn of the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century 
most firms were managed by their equity holders who were few in 
number.20 In this arrangement, the interests of equity owners and 
management clearly align because they are the same people. At the turn 
of the twentieth century, however, large firms increasingly had public 
stockholders who held small fractions of the firm’s equity.21 Moreover, 
managers were increasingly outside professionals with little ownership 
interest in the firm.22 This shift in corporate ownership and 
management occurred as regulation of corporate governance was 
becoming more lax.23 The disappearance of strict regulations of 
corporations occurred, Justice Brandeis noted, as states competed for 
the revenue generated by corporate charters—a phenomenon that is 
now commonly referred to as the “race to the bottom.”24 
The growing prominence of corporations and the increasing 
independent power of managers set off the early debate over corporate 
responsibility between Adolf A. Berle and E. Merrick Dodd. Their 
debate appeared in a pair of articles in the Harvard Law Review in 1931 
and 1932.25 Berle and Dodd’s disagreement was about to whom 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 84. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. (citing JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 43 (2d ed. 
1995)); see also Johnson, supra note 4, at 975 (“Early in the nineteenth century, states had 
strictly controlled corporate attributes and powers in numerous ways. For example, states 
typically limited the amount of capital a single corporation could assemble; restricted the scope 
of corporate powers; limited the duration of a corporation to a period ranging, generally, from 
twenty to fifty years; placed limits on company indebtedness; prohibited the holding of stock in 
another corporation; and gave stockholders broad veto powers over proposed transactions.” 
(citing Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 542–60 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
 24 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 979 (quoting William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate 
Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665–66 (1974)). 
 25 A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. 
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
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corporate managers should be accountable. Berle argued that corporate 
managers should act as trustees for shareholders and manage the 
corporation exclusively for their benefit.26 In contrast, Dodd believed 
that as corporations grew in size and power, they should be managed 
with consideration of the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders.27 
After this initial exchange of views in the Harvard Law Review, this 
debate did not receive significant attention for over two decades.28 This 
is attributable, at least in part, to the fact that New Deal legislation 
addressed many perceived social dangers of large businesses.29 However, 
over time Berle and Dodd’s views on this question began to converge. 
By 1934, Dodd was expressing doubt about freeing corporate managers 
to consider stakeholder interests.30 His concern was that if fiduciary 
duties to shareholders were weakened, nothing definitive would replace 
them, leaving managers too much discretion to pursue their own 
personal interests at the expense of the corporation.31 Berle, on the other 
hand, wrote in 1959 that “[t]he argument has been settled . . . squarely in 
favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.”32 The evolution and convergence 
of Berle and Dodd’s views highlight a prominent tension in this debate. 
Many will acknowledge that non-shareholder stakeholders are deeply 
impacted by corporate action and thus it would be good if corporate 
managers considered all stakeholders in making corporate decisions. 
However, granting managers such broad discretion runs the risk that 
they will utilize that discretion to further their own interests at the 
expense of the corporation. As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel 
wrote in 1991, “a manager told to serve two masters (a little for the 
equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is 
answerable to neither.”33 
After Berle and Dodd’s debate, the next appearance of scholarly 
attention to how corporate governance could improve corporate social 
 
 26 Berle, Jr., supra note 25, at 1049 (“It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to a 
corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation, 
whether derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only 
for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.”). 
 27 Dodd, Jr., supra note 25, at 1160 (“A sense of social responsibility toward employees, 
consumers, and the general public may thus come to be regarded as the appropriate attitude to 
be adopted by those who are engaged in business . . . .”). 
 28 Wells, supra note 2, at 99. 
 29 Id.; see also BARRY EICHENGREEN, HALL OF MIRRORS: THE GREAT DEPRESSION, THE 
GREAT RECESSION, AND THE USES—AND MISUSES—OF HISTORY 270 (2015); Katharine V. 
Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Comparative 
Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 317–18 (2011). 
 30 See Wells, supra note 2, at 98. 
 31 Id. 
 32 STOUT, supra note 13, at 18 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST 
REVOLUTION 169 (1954)). 
 33 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991). 
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responsibility arose in the 1950s. At that time, many commentators 
agreed that U.S. corporations had become a great economic success, but 
worries persisted about their extraordinary and increasing economic, 
political, and social power.34 In 1950, corporate analyst Peter Drucker 
proposed a new conception of the corporate board as a “maker of 
policy” that would have representatives of all stakeholders.35 In 1959, 
Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes argued that all stakeholders 
should be involved in corporate decision making, but acknowledged the 
practical challenges in implementing such an arrangement.36 Neither of 
these proposals led to substantial legal changes. 
During the social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s, the first modern 
movement to improve corporate social responsibility arose just as the 
Chicago School of Economics was emerging. The Chicago School’s 
economic analysis of corporate governance argued forcefully in favor of 
shareholder primacy.37 This analytical perspective ultimately achieved 
great popularity and widely impacted both public perceptions of the role 
of the corporation and regulation of the corporation. In the meantime, 
however, those in favor of broader stakeholder protections continued 
proposing and implementing new strategies to improve corporate social 
responsibility. 
Prominent among the activists pursuing greater corporate 
responsibility in this era was Ralph Nader. Nader, along with Mark J. 
Green and Joel Seligman published Taming the Giant Corporation in 
1976, in which they argued for federal chartering of corporations.38 
Citing an exhaustive list of potential or perceived social and economic 
costs of big business,39 and the trend among states to roll back 
restrictions on corporations,40 Nader, Green, and Seligman proposed 
that corporations be chartered at the federal level to bring federal 
authority to bear on the interstate (and potentially detrimental) actions 
of corporations.41 The federally chartered corporations that they 
envisioned would have had a governance structure that enhanced board 
review of executive actions and included professional, full-time, and 
salaried directors.42 Another trend in the 1970s was for community 
activists to purchase shares of large corporations in order to attend 
shareholder meetings and make shareholder proposals for socially 
 
 34 See Wells, supra note 2, at 100. 
 35 Id. at 106 (citing PETER. F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 341–42 (1950)). 
 36 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 977–78 (citing Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and 
the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 41 (Edward S. Mason ed., 
1959)). 
 37 This view of corporate governance is discussed in more detail in Section III.A below. 
 38 NADER ET AL., supra note 1. 
 39 Id. at 17–32. 
 40 Id. at 43–61. 
 41 Id. at 70–71. 
 42 Id. at 120–21. 
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responsible corporate policies.43 Overall, these campaigns had mixed 
success, sometimes succeeding in bringing public attention to the issue 
even when losing a shareholder vote.44 This vein of activism and debate 
continued throughout the 1970s. However, anti-business sentiment 
began to fade by the end of the decade and the economic boom of the 
1980s diffused enthusiasm for these initiatives.45 
In the 1980s, hostile corporate takeovers became prevalent as 
corporate “raiders” sought to profit from divesting portions of the large 
conglomerates that were the product of 1960s and 1970s merger 
activity.46 The public widely perceived these takeovers as profiting the 
acquirer at the public’s expense in the form of widespread job losses.47 
These perceptions reignited the debate over whether shareholders 
should be the sole focus of corporate decision making.48 One important 
result of this revived concern was the passage of constituency statutes in 
many states. Constituency statutes explicitly permit directors to 
consider the effects of their decisions on a variety of stakeholder 
interests.49 Thirty-three states now have constituency statutes, although 
it remains unclear to what extent they would protect a director against 
shareholder action in court.50 Some thought that the advent of 
 
 43 Johnson, supra note 4, at 982–83. 
 44 Id. at 983. One of the most highly publicized examples of this movement, Campaign GM, 
is discussed in Section IV.B.3.b. 
 45 See Wells, supra note 2, at 120–23. 
 46 Fabienne Cretin et al., M&A Activity: Where Are We in the Cycle?, ALTERNATIVE INV. 
ANALYST REV. (2015), https://www.caia.org/sites/default/files/AIAR_Q3_2015-07_M&A_
CretinDieudonneBoucha.pdf. 
 47 See Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on 
Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit 
Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 660 (2013); Wells, supra note 2, at 126. 
 48 See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1992). 
 49 See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8.85 (2018) (stating that directors “may . . . consider 
the effects of any action . . . upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation or its 
subsidiaries, communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation or its 
subsidiaries are located, and all other pertinent factors”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 717(b)(2)(i)–
(v) (McKinney 2003) (stating that “director[s] shall be entitled to consider . . . the effects that 
the corporation’s actions may have in the short-term or in the long-term upon any of the 
following: (i) the prospects for potential growth, development, productivity and profitability of 
the corporation; (ii) the corporation’s current employees; (iii) the corporation’s retired 
employees and other beneficiaries receiving or entitled to receive retirement, welfare or similar 
benefits from or pursuant to any plan sponsored, or agreement entered into, by the 
corporation; (iv) the corporation’s customers and creditors; and (v) the ability of the 
corporation to provide, as a going concern, goods, services, employment opportunities and 
employment benefits and otherwise to contribute to the communities in which it does 
business”); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2013) (stating that directors 
may consider “[t]he effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action, 
including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and 
upon communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located”). 
 50 See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional 
Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. 
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constituency statutes would resolve concerns about shareholder 
primacy, but both share price primacy, and concerns about its negative 
social effects persist.51 
The 1980s also saw a global trend of economic liberalization 
motivated by “Washington Consensus”–inspired thinking.52 This turn 
to liberalization accelerated the interconnectedness of nations and 
businesses.53 Consequently, corporations were increasingly able to 
operate abroad, in places where regulation of labor standards, 
environmental protection, bribery, human rights, and other matters 
may be less stringent.54 Beginning in the 1990s, the public became 
increasingly aware of negative social externalities that had gone 
unaddressed by multinational corporations.55 Major brands such as 
Nike and The Gap were featured in news stories about sweatshop 
working conditions and other abuses abroad.56 In response to non-
governmental organization advocacy and public pressure, multinational 
corporations began in the 1990s to draft corporate codes of conduct and 
issue corporate responsibility reports.57 Today, most multinational 
corporations regularly issue corporate responsibility reports.58 While 
this development represents some progress toward greater social 
accountability, the lack of standards for measuring social impact and the 
lack of any enforceable obligation to comply with these standards makes 
 
L. 221, 237–39 (2012) (describing Ben & Jerry’s decision to be acquired by Unilever in spite of 
being subject to Vermont’s constituency statute). 
 51 See Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1383 (2011) (“The ‘progressive’ corporate law 
movement advocated structural changes in corporate law itself designed to serve the interests of 
nonshareholders with a stake in a corporation’s activities, such as ‘other constituency’ statutes 
that expand directors’ discretion. Most would agree, however, that neither movement produced 
much real change.”). 
 52 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1248–49 (Samuel O. Idowu et 
al. eds., 2013). 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Corporate Social Responsibility: The Shape of a History, 1945-2004 7 (Ctr. for Ethical 
Bus. Cultures, Working Paper No. 1, 2005), http://www.cebcglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/02/CSR-The_Shape_of_a_History.pdf. 
 55 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 52, at 1249. 
 56 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Opinion, In America; Children of the Dark Ages, N.Y. TIMES (July 
21, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/21/opinion/in-america-children-of-the-dark-
ages.html (detailing the terrible working conditions of two Central American teenagers who 
were employed in factories making clothing for U.S. retailers); Bob Herbert, Opinion, In 
America; Nike’s Pyramid Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/
06/10/opinion/in-america-nike-s-pyramid-scheme.html (detailing the abysmal pay and 
working conditions of Nike factories in Asia). 
 57 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 52, at 1250. 
 58 See ADRIAN KING & WIM BARTELS, CURRENTS OF CHANGE: THE KPMG SURVEY OF 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2015 30 (2015), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/
dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/02/kpmg-international-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-
2015.pdf (finding that ninety-two percent of Global Fortune 250 companies report on corporate 
responsibility). 
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corporate responsibility reporting generally ineffective.59 
The early 2000s brought the large corporate fraud scandals of 
Enron, WorldCom, and others, which renewed public concern about 
the social impact of corporate activities.60 The largest public reaction to 
this was the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which aimed to avoid 
corporate fraud through changes to board structures, increased financial 
reporting requirements, increased penalties for securities violations, and 
higher standards for conflicts of interest.61 Most recently came the 2008 
financial crisis, public outrage about executive wrongdoing, and the 
resulting passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. The 2000s also brought a marked increase in the ability 
of shareholders to force corporate managers to act in their interests, a 
trend that will be discussed further in Part III, below.62 
Concern about the negative social impacts of shareholder-focused 
corporate action has therefore existed since the time that corporations 
began to become the enormous and powerful institutions that they are 
today. Much of that concern arises from the separation of three groups 
of people: the managers (directors and officers) who run the 
corporation; the shareholders who own shares and have limited rights to 
impact corporate decisions; and other stakeholders who are not 
involved in corporate governance, such as employees, customers, and 
community members. Scholars have debated for nearly a century now 
about how to maximize social benefit and minimize social harms from 
corporate activities. Regulations have arisen over this time period in an 
attempt to safeguard the public from the negative externalities of 
corporate profit-seeking. Prominent examples of the direct regulation of 
corporate governance include the Securities and Exchange Acts63 and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,64 but many others exist as well. Laws such as 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act65 and the National 
Environmental Policy Act66 have been directed specifically at the non-
shareholder stakeholders affected by corporate action. However, it was 
not until the current social enterprise movement that legislatures 
amended state corporation law to provide a governance structure 
specifically intended to promote stakeholder well-being. 
 
 59 See Esposito, supra note 47, at 653–59. 
 60 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 980; Wells, supra note 2, at 77. 
 61 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 980–81. 
 62 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010). 
 63 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa (2012); Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–qq (2012). 
 64 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–66, 78o-6, 78d-3, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348–50 
1519–20, 1514A (2012). 
 65 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78, 42 U.S.C. § 3142-1 
(2012). 
 66 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012). 
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B.     The Social Enterprise Movement 
The social enterprise movement can be seen as the latest iteration 
of the long history of debate and activism around holding corporations 
accountable for the social harm or good they produce. Thus, it can be 
seen as the most recent response to the “race to the bottom” described 
by Justice Brandeis—the deregulation of corporate decision making as 
states compete for corporate charters.67 The current social enterprise 
movement began in the mid-2000s,68 and was likely influenced by the 
corporate fraud scandals of the early 2000s.69 The movement has grown 
much larger since 2008, and was likely accelerated by the widespread 
negative social effects of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent Great 
Recession.70 
A defining characteristic of the movement is that it does not aim to 
impose new regulations or requirements on existing businesses. Rather, 
it consists of a variety of innovations that will allow businesses that 
independently desire to be more socially responsible or pursue social 
missions to opt in to greater social accountability. The movement is 
propelled by a desire among entrepreneurs and investors to operate for-
profit businesses that achieve social goals. Social enterprises are 
therefore often described as dual-purpose organizations that combine 
 
 67 Johnson, supra note 4, at 975–76. 
 68 B Lab, which describes itself as “a nonprofit organization that serves a global movement 
of people using business as a force for goodTM[,]” was founded in 2006. Our History, CERTIFIED 
B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/our-
history (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). Vermont adopted the first legislation for Low-Profit Limited 
Liability Companies (or “L3Cs,” a form of social enterprise) in April 2008. Dana Brakman 
Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 108 n.10 (2010). 
 69 See BOB DOHERTY ET AL., MANAGEMENT FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 214 (2009) (“Much has 
been made in recent times of the problems associated with ‘white-collar crime’ and the myriad 
examples of high-profile governance misdemeanours bear testament to this. The most 
notorious examples are often recounted in newspaper or journal articles as symptomatic of 
governance failure, including Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and BAE.”); Raymond Horton, 
Thoughts on the Meaning and Field of Social Enterprise, TAMER CTR. SOC. ENTERPRISE, http://
www8.gsb.columbia.edu/socialenterprise/about/meaningse (last visited Mar. 19, 2018) (“Any 
notion that ethical behavior in business is not a public good is dispelled by the devastating 
social consequences inflicted by the many immoral senior managers we’ve seen post-Enron.”); 
Entrepreneur Middle East Staff, Eight Business Schools Around the World That Have a Social 
Enterprise Focus, ENTREPRENEUR: MIDDLE EAST (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/253352 (discussing the trend in business schools to include social enterprise curricula in 
response to students’ disenchantment with the social effects of large corporations). 
 70 See Status Tool: All, supra note 6 (showing social enterprise entity legislation began to be 
adopted by states in 2008 and accelerated thereafter); see also J. Haskell Murray, Adopting 
Stakeholder Advisory Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 61, 63 (2017); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your 
Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. 
REV. 1 (2012); Our History, supra note 68 (describing the history of B Lab’s efforts to promote 
social enterprise and indicating that their mission gained traction in 2008 and accelerated in 
2010). 
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aspects of nonprofit and for-profit businesses.71 
One of the earliest and most successful projects of the social 
enterprise movement in the United States was not a legal effort. It was B 
Lab Company’s development of B Corp certification. B Lab is a 
nonprofit corporation formed in Pennsylvania dedicated to promoting 
business practices with high levels of social and environmental 
performance.72 B Lab created the “Certified B Corporation” designation, 
which it licenses to businesses that meet its standards of social and 
environmental accountability.73 B Lab formed in 2006,74 certified its first 
B Corp in 2007,75 and as of April 5, 2018, reported certifying 2457 B 
Corporations in more than fifty countries.76 The choice to become a 
certified B Corporation and maintain that certification is self-imposed 
and privately regulated. It is not a legal form, and in the United States, B 
Corps use existing state law–governed corporate forms. However, B Lab 
was involved in designing and advocating for benefit corporation 
legislation.77 
While B Corp certification has been very successful, advocates of 
the social enterprise movement, including B Lab itself, have found 
traditionally available business forms—nonprofit corporations or 
traditional for-profit entities (corporations, LLCs, partnerships, and sole 
proprietorships)—insufficient to meet social entrepreneurs’ 
aspirations.78 Nonprofit corporations are legally prohibited from 
distributing profits to any individuals that exercise control over them—a 
concept referred to as the “nondistribution constraint.”79 Therefore, 
because they cannot offer a return to investors, they must rely on 
donations for funding and comply with the substantial reporting 
burdens imposed on nonprofits.80 For-profit businesses, on the other 
hand, can raise capital from investors and, in the opinion of many 
observers, legally pursue social aims.81 However, for-profit businesses 
 
 71 See, e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 387, 388 (2014); Page & Katz, supra note 51, at 1368; Brakman Reiser, supra note 68, 108–
09. 
 72 About B Lab, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-
b-lab (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
 73 Brakman Reiser, supra note 68, at 114. 
 74 Our History, supra note 68. 
 75 Id. 
 76 CERTIFIED B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
 77 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 619, 637 (2010) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing]. 
 78 See Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 12, at 683. 
 79 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980). 
 80 Nonprofits are permitted to earn income from business activities. So, once a nonprofit is 
operating, this can also serve as a source of funds. See, e.g., Emily Chan, The Profitable Side of 
Nonprofits—Part I: Earned Income, NEO L. GROUP (May 6, 2011), http://www.nonprofitlaw
blog.com/the-profitable-side-of-nonprofits-part-i-earned-income. 
 81 See infra Section IV.B.1. 
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have no enforceable commitment to pursue social good and are likely to 
succumb to shareholder wealth maximization pressures if they attract 
dispersed shareholders. Because of these perceived inadequacies, the 
social enterprise movement has resulted in several new and innovative 
legal forms for businesses that seek to simultaneously pursue profit and 
social goals. Each of these novel forms was designed by starting with an 
existing business entity form and adding a social mission component.82 
An early experiment with a new legal form for social enterprises is 
the low profit limited liability company (L3C). The L3C is a dual-
purpose entity based on the limited liability company form.83 The first 
legislation creating the L3C entity was adopted in Vermont in 2008.84 As 
of April 5, 2018, L3C legislation was in force in Vermont, seven other 
states, and two Native American tribes.85 A primary goal for the creation 
of the L3C was to create an entity into which private foundations could 
make “program related investments” (PRIs), without being subject to 
excise taxes.86 However, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not 
provided clear guidance to confirm that investments into L3Cs would 
qualify as PRIs.87 It is likely, at least in part due to the lack of clear 
guidance from the IRS, that this entity has not been widely used, and 
L3C legislation has failed to pass in many more jurisdictions than those 
in which it has succeeded.88 
Other legal entities have also arisen in the United States to facilitate 
social enterprise but have not yet been widely adopted. These include 
the Social Purpose Corporation89 and the Benefit Limited Liability 
Company.90 Of the legal forms established to date, the most popular has 
been the benefit corporation, which is described in more detail below.91 
 
 82 Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 12, at 690. 
 83 Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing, supra note 77, at 621. 
 84 H. Res. 775, 2008 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2008). 
 85 See What Is an L3C?, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C, https://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c  
(last updated Apr. 1, 2018); Status Tool: All, supra note 6. 
 86 Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing, supra note 77, at 622; Esposito, supra note 47, 
at 682-83. 
 87 THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. & MORRISON & FOERSTER, WHICH LEGAL STRUCTURE IS 
RIGHT FOR MY SOCIAL ENTERPRISE?: A GUIDE TO ESTABLISHING A SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 60–61 (May 2013), http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/Guide-to-
Establishing-a-Social-Enterprise.pdf. 
 88 Businesses continue to form as L3Cs. According to interSector Partners L3C, as of April 
5, 2018, 1599 existed. What Is an L3C?, supra note 85. However, L3C legislation failed in 
seventeen states and was repealed in North Carolina. Status Tool: L3Cs, SOC. ENTERPRISE L. 
TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/#/l3cs (last visited Apr. 5, 2018).  
 89 Social Purpose Corporation legislation has been adopted in four states. Status Tool: SPCs, 
SOC. ENTERPRISE L. TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/#/spcs (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
 90 Benefit Limited Liability Company legislation has been adopted in three states, is under 
consideration in Connecticut, and failed in Virginia. Status Tool: BLLCs, SOC. ENTERPRISE L. 
TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/#/bllcs (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
 91 See Status Tool: Benefit Corps, SOC. ENTERPRISE L. TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/
#/bcorps (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
2018] BE N E FIT  C O RP O R A T IO N S  1799 
II.     BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
A.     Background 
The benefit corporation is the result of efforts by a variety of social 
enterprise advocates. B Lab was deeply involved in the very successful 
lobbying efforts to encourage state legislatures to adopt benefit 
corporation legislation.92 The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation93 
was drafted by attorneys at Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.94 
The comments to the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation 
describe the benefit corporation as “a form of business corporation that 
offers entrepreneurs and investors the option to build, and invest in, a 
business that operates with a corporate purpose broader than 
maximizing shareholder value and that consciously undertakes a 
responsibility to maximize the benefits of its operations for all 
stakeholders, not just shareholders.”95 The benefit corporation form 
aims to allow businesses to pursue missions other than share price 
maximization by increasing the board’s discretion to consider social 
goals in making business decisions for the corporation,96 while also 
empowering shareholders to monitor the pursuit of those social goals.97 
It is clear how this fits into the longstanding debate over corporate social 
responsibility. Benefit corporations explicitly inject non-shareholder 
stakeholder interests into the governance of the entity, thus overcoming 
the question of whether corporate managers should independently 
decide to pursue ends other than share price maximization. 
States adopt benefit corporation legislation via new statutory 
provisions in the corporate code, but where benefit corporation statutes 
are silent, traditional for-profit corporation law controls.98 Thus, while 
benefit corporations are correctly conceived of as dual-purpose entities 
situated somewhere between nonprofit and for-profit corporations, they 
more closely resemble for-profit corporations. As noted above, the 
benefit corporation has been the most widely adopted social enterprise 
entity in the United States to date. The first benefit corporation 
legislation was enacted in Maryland in 2010.99 To date, benefit 
 
 92 Esposito, supra note 47, at 695. 
 93 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8. 
 94 The Model Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
 95 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 101 cmt. 
 96 Esposito, supra note 47, at 695. 
 97 Monitoring is facilitated via benefit reporting and in some jurisdictions, benefit 
enforcement proceedings, which are discussed in more detail in Section II.B. 
 98 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 101(c); Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra 
note 11, at 595–96. 
 99 See B Lab, Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CSR 
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corporation legislation has been adopted in thirty-four states and 
Washington, D.C., and is under consideration in six more.100 
The benefit corporation’s relative popularity among social 
entrepreneurs is attributable to the fact that it provides a framework to 
facilitate commitment to social mission using a corporate form that is 
designed specifically for dual-purpose enterprises. The fact that it is 
based on the traditional corporate form provides several benefits. First, 
it is a for-profit form, so it permits raising capital from investors. 
Second, corporations are more standardized entities than partnerships 
or LLCs, so social entrepreneurs with little legal expertise or funding for 
legal assistance may find them a more accessible way to incorporate 
social mission into their business purpose.101 Third, corporations 
provide opportunities for scale. While many examples exist of socially 
conscious businesses being successfully run as privately held 
companies,102 many social entrepreneurs have their sights set higher and 
prefer a corporate form that will allow their businesses to eventually 
attract investment from a broad investor base and even go public.103 
Several examples exist of companies that were successfully running 
social enterprises in existing forms such as traditional corporations or 
LLCs, but which nonetheless chose to convert to the benefit corporation 
form so that they would be held more accountable to their social 
mission.104 
 
WIRE (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-
First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation.  
 100 State by State Status of Legislation, supra note 7. 
 101 See Brackman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 12, at 689. It is worth noting that the 
LLC remains a very popular entity choice for entrepreneurs, generally. 
 102 For example, TOMS Shoes is a Delaware LLC; Yogi Tea is an Oregon LLC and certified B 
Corp; Mission-Hub is a California LLC and certified B Corp. 
 103 See Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 12, at 689; cf. Mike Isaac & David 
Gelles, Kickstarter Focuses Its Mission on Altruism over Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/technology/kickstarters-altruistic-vision-profits-as-the-
means-not-the-mission.html?_r=1 (quoting Kickstarter’s CEO stating that “[w]e don’t ever 
want to sell or go public. . . . That would push the company to make choices that we don’t think 
are in the best interest of the company”); Hannah Miller, Patagonia Founder Takes Aim: “The 
Elephant in the Room Is Growth”, GREENBIZ (Mar. 1, 2013, 7:00 AM), https://
www.greenbiz.com/news/2013/03/01/patagonia-founder-takes-aim-elephant-room-growth 
(conveying Patagonia founder’s views that publicly traded companies are incapable of 
maintaining sustainable practices). 
 104 See, e.g., Elissa Loughman, Benefit Corporation Update: Patagonia Passes B Impact 
Assessment, Improves Score to 116, PATAGONIA (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.patagonia.com/
blog/2014/10/benefit-corporation-update-patagonia-passes-b-impact-assessment-improves-
score-to-116 (“Benefit Corporation legislation creates the legal framework to enable mission-
driven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-driven through succession, capital raises, and 
even changes in ownership, by institutionalizing the values, culture, processes, and high 
standards put in place by founding entrepreneurs.”); Our Business, METHOD, http://
methodhome.com/beyond-the-bottle/our-business (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (“[I]n [A]ugust 
2013, method reincorporated as a benefit corporation and formally incorporated our mandate 
for sustainability into the DNA of our company.”); Strickler et al., supra note 9 (“From 
Kickstarter’s inception, we’ve focused on serving artists, creators, and audiences to help bring 
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This Article will argue that, as currently designed, benefit 
corporations will face challenges that inhibit their ability to produce 
meaningful social outcomes. Nonetheless, the benefit corporation is a 
very innovative attempt to solve a long-debated problem, and thus 
deserves serious consideration to ensure it is effective in creating 
businesses that successfully pursue social good simultaneously with 
profit. 
B.     How They Work 
The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation reflects the input of 
private attorneys, state legislatures, state bar associations, Secretaries of 
State offices, Attorneys General offices, nonprofit groups, and 
businesses.105 The details of benefit corporation legislation vary across 
states. This Article will focus primarily on the aspects of the Model 
Legislation that are fundamental to the benefit corporation structure 
and thus are present in the majority of benefit corporation legislation. 
Key points of divergence among jurisdictions will be pointed out where 
relevant. 
There are three primary legal innovations that are consistent across 
most states that benefit corporation legislation uses to pursue its goals: 
(1) stating the social mission in the benefit corporation’s corporate 
purpose; (2) obligating directors to consider the effects of corporate 
action on non-financial stakeholder groups; and (3) requiring reporting 
on social impact.106 
Corporate Purpose. Pursuant to the Model Legislation, benefit 
corporations must be formed for the purpose of creating a general 
public benefit,107 which is defined as a “material positive impact on 
 
creative projects to life. Our new status as a Benefit Corporation hard-codes that mission at the 
deepest level possible to guide us, and future leaders of Kickstarter.”); Press Release, Laureate 
Educ., Inc., Laureate Education Becomes a Public Benefit Corporation (Feb. 10, 2015), http://
www.laureate.net/NewsRoom/PressReleases/2015/10/Laureate-Education-Becomes-a-Public-
Benefit-Corporation (“As a Public Benefit Corporation, Laureate is required to balance the 
financial interests of its stockholders with the best interests of those stakeholders materially 
affected by its conduct, including particularly those impacted by the specific benefit purpose set 
forth in its certificate of incorporation.”). 
 105 The Model Legislation, supra note 94. 
 106 WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. & LARRY VRANKA, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT 
CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL 
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 15 (Jan. 18, 2013), http://
benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf. 
 107 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 201(a). The Delaware Public Benefit Corporation 
(PBC) statute does not require a “general public benefit” purpose, but instead requires that 
Delaware PBCs identify one or more specific public benefits that will be among the 
corporation’s purposes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2018). California, Colorado, and 
Minnesota also require a specific public benefit. J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social 
Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes (Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished paper), http://dx.doi.org/
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society and the environment, taken as a whole, from the business and 
operations of [the] benefit corporation assessed taking into account the 
impacts of the benefit corporation as reported against a third-party 
standard.”108 The benefit corporation may also choose, but is not 
required, to specify a specific public benefit purpose. The general public 
benefit purpose and, if applicable, specific purpose, must be stated in the 
benefit corporation’s articles of incorporation.109 Because corporate 
directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, the effect of including 
social mission in the corporate purpose is to clarify that a business 
decision in furtherance of the social mission is indeed in the best 
interest of the corporation.110 This protects corporate directors against 
claims that the financial interests of the corporation must take 
precedence over the social mission. 
Consideration of Non-Shareholder Stakeholders. The Model 
Legislation requires that benefit corporation directors consider the 
effects of their actions on a non-exhaustive, illustrative list of 
stakeholders that includes shareholders, but also includes employees, 
customers, the community, the environment, and any other factors or 
interests they deem appropriate.111 While the “corporate purpose” 
 
10.2139/ssrn.1988556. 
 108 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 102. 
 109 See id. § 201 (mandating a general public benefit purpose and describing optional specific 
public benefit purpose); id. § 101(c) (stating that except as specified in the Model Legislation, 
state corporation law is applicable to benefit corporations); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 102(a)(3) (requiring Delaware corporations to state their purpose in their certificates of 
incorporation). 
 110 CLARK, JR. & VRANKA, supra note 106, at 16; MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 201. 
 111 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 301. 
In discharging the duties of their respective positions and in considering the best 
interests of the benefit corporation, the board of directors, committees of the board, 
and individual directors of a benefit corporation:  
(1) shall consider the effects of any action or inaction upon:  
(i) the shareholders of the benefit corporation;  
(ii) the employees and work force of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, 
and its suppliers;  
(iii) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general public benefit or a 
specific public benefit purpose of the benefit corporation;  
(iv) community and societal factors, including those of each community in 
which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or its 
suppliers are located;  
(v) the local and global environment;  
(vi) the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation, including 
benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term plans and 
the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued 
independence of the benefit corporation; and  
(vii) the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public 
benefit purpose and any specific public benefit purpose; and  
(2) may consider:  
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requirement protects directors when they choose to act on behalf of 
non-shareholder stakeholders, this provision affirmatively requires that 
they consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders. However, 
the Model Legislation explicitly states that directors need not prioritize 
any particular stakeholder’s interest.112 So, benefit corporations may not 
wholly ignore the interests of any stakeholder group, but are required 
only to consider the effects of corporate action on this long list of 
stakeholders; they are not required to act in furtherance of the interests 
of any one or more stakeholder groups. 
Reporting on Social Impact. Under the Model Legislation, benefit 
corporations are required to prepare an annual benefit report, distribute 
it to shareholders, file it with the department of state,113 and make it 
publicly available on the benefit corporation’s website.114 Many states 
with benefit corporation legislation do not require all three methods of 
dissemination.115 The report must describe the ways the benefit 
corporation has pursued the general public benefit and its specific 
public benefit, if any, and the success it has had in creating these 
benefits.116 It must also assess the benefit corporation’s overall social 
performance using an independent, third-party standard.117 B Lab’s “B 
Impact Assessment”118 is the most often referred-to source of an 
independent third-party standard for the annual benefit report. While B 
Lab’s benefitcorp.net website lists several other potential sources of an 
independent third-party standard,119 available evidence suggests that the 
 
[(i) the interests referred to in [cite constituencies provision of the business 
corporation law if it refers to constituencies not listed above]; and  
(ii)] other pertinent factors or the interests of any other group that they deem 
appropriate; but  
(3) need not give priority to a particular interest or factor referred to in paragraph (1) 
or (2) over any other interest or factor unless the benefit corporation has stated in its 
articles of incorporation its intention to give priority to certain interests or factors 
related to the accomplishment of its general public benefit purpose or of a specific 
public benefit purpose identified in its articles. 
Id. 
 112 CLARK, JR. & VRANKA, supra note 106, at 17. 
 113 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 401. 
 114 Id. § 402. 
 115 Only about half of benefit corporation states require that the report be filed with the 
state. See Murray, supra note 107. Most states require public posting and distribution to 
shareholders, but there are a few states that do not require one or both. Minnesota and 
Delaware do not require public posting. Minnesota and Washington do not require distribution 
of the reports directly to shareholders. Id. 
 116 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 401(a)(1). 
 117 CLARK, JR. & VRANKA, supra note 106, at 17–20; MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, 
§ 401. 
 118 Performance Requirements, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-
b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/performance-requirements (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
 119 How Do I Pick a Third Party Standard?, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/
businesses/how-do-i-pick-third-party-standard (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
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B Impact Assessment is the most often  used standard for this 
purpose.120 The annual benefit report is intended to keep shareholders 
and the public informed about the benefit corporation’s pursuit of and 
success in achieving its social mission. 
Under the Model Legislation, shareholders holding two percent of 
the benefit corporation’s shares may derivatively bring a benefit 
enforcement proceeding against the benefit corporation or its 
directors.121 Most, but not all, benefit corporation statutes provide for 
benefit enforcement proceedings.122 Benefit enforcement proceedings 
may be brought for failure by the corporation to pursue its general or 
specific public benefit, or for the violation of any obligation under the 
benefit corporation law.123 The benefit enforcement proceeding grants 
shareholders an explicit right to legally enforce the corporation’s 
commitment to social mission. While the Model Legislation does not 
specify what remedies are available in a benefit enforcement 
proceeding,124 several states have clarified in their adopting legislation 
that monetary damages are not available and the only remedy is 
injunctive relief.125 No benefit enforcement proceedings have gone to 
court to date,126 so the standard for these proceedings remains untested. 
Finally, once a business has chosen the benefit corporation form 
and thereby committed to the mechanisms described above, the Model 
Legislation seeks to ensure the business cannot easily choose to abandon 
its benefit corporation status. The Model Legislation requires a 
supermajority (two-thirds) shareholder vote to terminate benefit 
corporation status.127 
Individual state statutes have introduced additional statutory 
innovations,128 including requiring a “benefit director” on the board to 
oversee the preparation of the annual benefit report,129 allowing for the 
 
 120 Murray, supra note 11, at 56 (finding that of the eight benefit reports reviewed in this 
study, seven relied on the B Impact Assessment as their independent third party standard; the 
eighth listed an individual’s name). 
 121 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 305(c). 
 122 There is no benefit enforcement proceeding in California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, and Washington. Murray, supra note 107. 
 123 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 102. 
 124 Prior versions of the Model Legislation available online provided explicitly that monetary 
damages were not available for benefit enforcement proceedings. See, e.g., MODEL BENEFIT 
CORPORATION LEGISLATION: WITH EXPLANATORY COMMENTS § 305(b) (Apr. 4, 2016), http://
benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legislation_4_16.pdf. The 
most recent, April 17, 2017 version, however, has no such limitation. MODEL LEGISLATION, 
supra note 8. 
 125 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(c) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, 
§ 14(3) (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78B.190(3) (West 2017). 
 126 To the author’s knowledge. 
 127 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 105. 
 128 See Esposito, supra note 47, at 702–06. 
 129 Several states require a public benefit director for publicly traded benefit corporations. 
Others always require a public benefit director. Murray, supra note 107. 
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appointment of “benefit officers” charged with managing the benefit 
corporation’s pursuit of its social mission,130 requiring public comment 
on the annual benefit report,131 and automatic forfeiture of benefit 
corporation status for failure to file the annual benefit report.132 
The statutory provisions described above are intended to make it 
easier for, and thus more likely that, benefit corporations will be 
managed in a way that considers the impact of the corporation’s actions 
on a broad array of stakeholders. The corresponding enforcement 
mechanisms are intended to hold benefit corporations to these 
commitments. 
C.     Goal of Benefit Corporations 
The principal goal of benefit corporations is to permit businesses to 
pursue profits simultaneously with social goals (social mission).133 The 
creators and advocates of benefit corporations believe that shareholder 
primacy is the primary impediment to traditional corporations’ pursuit 
of social mission.134 Though, as will be discussed in Part III below, it is 
more accurate to say that it is a narrow focus on share price that 
impedes corporations’ pursuit of social goals, not a focus on shareholder 
interests more generally. Benefit corporation proponents also generally 
believe that shareholder primacy is enshrined in traditional corporation 
law.135 
On this basis, to liberate businesses to pursue social missions, the 
benefit corporation form aims to overcome shareholder primacy by 
making explicit in the benefit corporation’s formative documents that 
the benefit corporation was formed with the purpose of pursuing a 
social mission, and that directors are required to consider a wide range 
of stakeholder interests in pursuit of that purpose. With the aim of 
ensuring that benefit corporations are, in fact, operated in pursuit of 
their social missions, shareholders are granted a distinct form of 
action—the benefit enforcement proceeding—to enforce commitment 
to social mission. 
 
 130 The Model Legislation permits a benefit officer. MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, 
§ 304. 
 131 Public comment on the annual benefit report is required in Hawaii. Esposito, supra note 
47, at 706. 
 132 Automatic forfeiture of benefit corporation status for failure to file the annual benefit 
report is required in New Jersey. Id. And also in Minnesota. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301(5) 
(West 2017). 
 133 See BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net (last visited Apr. 5, 2018); see also CLARK, JR. & 
VRANKA, supra note 106, at 2; MODEL LEGISLATION § 101 cmt. 
 134 See CLARK, JR. & VRANKA, supra note 106, at 14. 
 135 See id.; FAQ, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/faq (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) 
(“Traditional Corporate Law Requires that Directors Place Profit Above All Else . . . .”). 
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While these are novel and important innovations, it is still only the 
shareholders who are granted rights to enforce the pursuit of social 
mission if management fails to do so. Shareholders are entrusted to act 
as proxies to represent non-shareholder stakeholder interests.136 The 
success of this enforcement mechanism depends upon the willingness of 
shareholders to act to enforce the social mission.137 The benefit 
corporation structure therefore relies on a reasonable assumption that 
those who choose to invest in benefit corporation equity will do so 
because of their commitment to public benefit. What is yet to be seen is 
whether that commitment to social mission will translate into 
shareholder action to protect the public benefit.138 
Given benefit corporations’ focus on overcoming share price 
primacy, it will be useful to understand the origin and evolution of share 
price primacy in U.S. corporations before assessing whether benefit 
corporations will be successful in overcoming this corporate tendency. 
III.     SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
A.     Theoretical Underpinnings of Shareholder Primacy 
As discussed above, since Berle and Dodd’s exchange in the 1930s, 
the debate over whether corporations have responsibilities to society 
beyond share price maximization has persisted.139 This debate between 
shareholder preferences and other stakeholder preferences is grounded 
in larger theoretical questions about the nature of corporations and their 
appropriate purpose. 
Scholars have put forth theories that conceive of the corporation in 
a variety of ways140; however, the theories most closely associated with 
shareholder primacy are the property theory and the nexus of contracts 
theory. The property theory conceives of corporations as aggregations of 
shareholders’ property.141 Under this theory, shareholders’ shares 
represent a fractional ownership of the corporation, and the 
shareholders, as owners, hire managers to run their corporation.142 This 
 
 136 See Esposito, supra note 47, at 700. 
 137 See Strine, Jr., supra note 12, at 245. 
 138 Id. at 250. 
 139 See STOUT, supra note 13, at 17; Wells, supra note 2, at 82. 
 140 These include theories that the corporation is an independent, artificially created entity, 
an aggregation of natural persons, an entity formed to facilitate collective effort by many 
parties, and an extension of the political state. See Lynn Stout, Corporate Entities: Their 
Ownership, Control, and Purpose §§ 3.1–.2, 3.5–.6 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 16-38, 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2841875. 
 141 Id. § 3.3. 
 142 Id. 
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theory, which was the basis of Berle and Gardiner Means’s famous 1934 
book The Modern Corporation and Private Property,143 clearly advocates 
in favor of shareholder primacy. If shareholders “own” the corporation, 
then it should operate in furtherance of their preferences. The nexus of 
contracts theory better accounts for the myriad individuals involved in 
corporate production, while still favoring shareholder primacy. The 
nexus of contracts theory has its origins in Ronald Coase’s work in 
which he conceived of the firm as a range of exchanges that took place 
within the firm rather than in the marketplace.144 Coase’s ideas were 
adapted by business professors Michael C. Jensen and William H. 
Meckling into a theory of firms as “legal fictions which serve as a nexus 
for a set of contracting relationships among individuals . . . .”145 The 
theory has evolved since Jensen and Meckling’s writing, and the modern 
nexus of contracts theory conceives of the corporation as a web of 
reciprocal agreements (not, in all cases, actual contracts)146 among the 
many parties associated with the corporation, including shareholders, 
directors, officers, employees, and creditors.147 Thus, the nexus of 
contracts theory takes into account the variety of stakeholders who are 
deeply tied to and affected by corporate action. However, while the 
nexus of contracts theory denies that shareholders own the corporation, 
it perceives them as having a reciprocal agreement with the corporation 
that shares many characteristics of ownership.148 It is on this basis that 
the traditional nexus of contracts theory reaches a similar conclusion as 
that of the property theory—that corporations should be managed for 
the benefit of their shareholders. 
As discussed in Part I above, the debate that Berle and Dodd began 
in the 1930s remained stagnant for several decades.149 During this time, 
managers were able to freely conceive of their role as that of trustees for 
 
 143 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
 144 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, 
and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 820–21 (1999) (citing Ronald H. Coase, The 
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)); see also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) 
(discussing an early conception of the firm as a nexus of contracts). 
 145 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310–11 (1976); Eisenberg, supra 
note 144, at 822 (concluding that Jensen and Meckling adapted Coase’s theory). 
 146 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 10–11 (2002) (“As used by contractarians, however, the term is not limited to 
relationships constituting legal contracts. Instead, contractarians use the word ‘contract’ to 
refer generally to long-term relationships characterized by asymmetric information, bilateral 
monopoly, and opportunism. The relationship between shareholders and creditors of a 
corporation is contractual in this sense, even though there is no single document we could 
identify as a legally binding contract through which they are in privity.” (footnote omitted)). 
 147 Stout, supra note 140, § 3.4. 
 148 See Bainbridge, supra note 146, at 6. 
 149 See STOUT, supra note 13, at 17. 
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a wider array of stakeholders because shareholders were dispersed and 
passive.150 In the 1960s and 1970s, the Chicago School of thinking about 
law and economics reignited the argument for shareholder value 
maximization on the basis of the property and nexus of contracts 
conceptions of the corporation. 
Milton Friedman wrote in 1962 that “there is one and only one 
social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in 
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the 
rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, 
without deception or fraud.”151 Based on the property theory of the 
corporation, Friedman’s position was both economic and moral. While 
he believed that management for non-shareholder constituencies would 
cause economic inefficiencies, he also believed that shareholders were 
the owners of corporations who had contributed capital to allow their 
corporations to operate, and therefore, it would be improper to manage 
them in anyone else’s interests.152 
In 1976, Jensen and Meckling formalized shareholder primacy in 
an economic “theory of the firm.”153 Their theory explained in economic 
terms how when unorganized and dispersed shareholders call upon 
managers to run the businesses in which they own shares, managers 
may not act in a way that maximizes shareholder welfare.154 In their 
analysis, Jensen and Meckling began to develop the nexus of contract 
theory but also continued to conceive of shareholders as “owners” of the 
firm.155 They therefore viewed shareholders as “principals” who hire 
managers as “agents” to manage the corporation. Because the managers 
will not bear the financial consequences of their decisions in managing 
the corporation, they are incentivized to make decisions that benefit the 
managers at the shareholders’ expense.156 This scenario results in 
“agency costs” due to what Berle and Means had termed the “separation 
of ownership and control.”157 Jensen and Meckling’s paper added the 
weight of formal economic analysis to an argument that had been made 
in more general terms for some time. 
Following Jensen and Meckling’s paper, concern began to grow 
 
 150 See Rock, supra note 13, at 1912–13. 
 151 FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 112. 
 152 See Wells, supra note 2, at 123–24. 
 153 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 145. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 308 (“We focus in this paper on the behavioral implications of the property rights 
specified in the contracts between the owners and managers of the firm.”). 
 156 Id. 
 157 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 143, at 6, 116 (“[I]t is therefore evident that we are dealing 
not only with distinct but often with opposing groups, ownership on the one side, control on 
the other—a control which tends to move further and further away from ownership and 
ultimately to lie in the hands of the management itself, a management capable of perpetuating 
its own position.”). 
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about the inefficiencies of agency costs, and an extraordinary amount of 
scholarship has been dedicated to this topic.158 Some of the potential 
detrimental effects of these agency costs that have been identified in this 
scholarship include: managers preferring less risk than diversified 
investors159; managers retaining higher than optimal amounts of cash to 
avoid having to attract new investment160; engaging in mergers and 
acquisitions without attention to the effect on shareholder returns161; 
and retaining earnings to build corporate “empires.”162 While material 
decisions that corporate officers make about a corporation are subject to 
review by the board of directors, the CEO appoints the directors. So, 
when shareholders are dispersed and passive, the argument goes, 
managers will be unrestrained in furthering their own interests at the 
expense of shareholders because the board members will align 
themselves with the management that appointed them.163 
The dispersed and passive nature of public shareholders is a key 
aspect of this analysis because shareholders do have limited rights to 
control or monitor corporate action. Shareholders have the right to elect 
directors to the board, vote on major transactions, inspect corporate 
books and records, and file derivative suits.164 However, a shareholder 
vote against corporate action requires a majority vote, directors are 
elected by a plurality,165 and derivative suits may only be brought by 
shareholders representing at least two percent of the corporation’s 
outstanding stock.166 So, utilizing these shareholder rights requires 
coordination among shareholders. Agency costs arise when 
shareholders cannot, or do not, organize to use these rights to ensure 
 
 158 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (2d ed. 2012); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity 
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency 
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the 
Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211 (1991); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic 
Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 251 (2014); see also EASTERBROOK 
& FISCHEL, supra note 33. 
 159 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 306–07 (1999); Rock, supra note 13, at 1913. 
 160 See Rock, supra note 13, at 1914. 
 161 Id. at 1915. 
 162 Blair & Stout, supra note 159, at 306. 
 163 See Rock, supra note 13, at 1916. 
 164 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211–12, 220, 251(c), 327 (West 2018). 
 165 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 215. But see, e.g., COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, 
FAQ: MAJORITY VOTING FOR DIRECTORS (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_
advocacy/board_accountability/majority_voting_directors/CII%20Majority%20Voting%
20FAQ%201-4-17.pdf (noting that many large-cap companies have recently adopted majority 
voting policies for director elections even though it is not legally required). 
 166 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367. 
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the firm is managed for their benefit. 
B.     Current Status of the Agency Cost Problem: Solved 
In a 2013 article, Professor Edward B. Rock concluded that the 
agency cost problem arising from the separation of ownership and 
control had been resolved.167 That is to say, U.S. public corporations are 
now being managed primarily for the benefit of their shareholders, a 
phenomenon that began to emerge in the 1980s just as the academic 
discussion of agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and 
control was gaining steam.168 Rock observed that currently, 
“[c]ompanies, shareholders, business schools, corporate law professors, 
and judges all seem to believe that the primary responsibility of 
directors is to maximize shareholder value.”169 This view is shared 
widely by other commentators.170 To those narrowly concerned about 
shareholder agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and 
control, this is indeed a solution to a problem. On the other hand, for 
proponents of corporate social responsibility, this state of affairs is 
instead a problem to be overcome. Indeed, this turn to a narrow focus 
on shareholder value has caused concern among both legal and business 
scholars about the potential negative effects of corporations focused on 
actions that increase share price in the short-term at the expense of 
long-term firm value creation.171 Rock himself notes, “[i]n a world in 
which managers’ high-powered equity incentives make them think and 
act like shareholders, it is important to remind managers and directors 
that the goal of the exercise is to create valuable firms, not to maximize 
shareholder value as an end in itself.”172 
Benefit corporations aim to overcome this trend toward 
 
 167 See Rock, supra note 13, at 1988. 
 168 See id. at 1910. 
 169 Id. at 1923. 
 170 See, e.g., Arthur R. Pinto & Franklin A. Gevurtz, United States: Corporate Governance for 
Publicly Traded Corporations, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FUNCTIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 1042, 1045 (Andreas Fleckner & Klaus Hopt eds., 2013); 
STOUT, supra note 13, at 3; Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 11, at 591 (“[F]or-
profit forms will create practical, if not legal, pressure to favor profit maximization over social 
good . . . .”); Strine, Jr., supra note 12, at 241. 
 171 See, e.g., Panel Transcripts from 2014 National Lawyers Convention: Millennials, Equity, 
and the Rule of Law: Corporations: The Short-Termism Debate, 85 MISS. L.J. 697 (2016); ASPEN 
INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE 
RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (Sept. 9, 2009) 
[hereinafter ASPEN INSTITUTE], https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/
docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf. Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout argued 
that the increase in institutional share ownership has tipped the political balance of power 
toward shareholders, which “allows them to capture a larger share of the rents from the 
corporate enterprise.” Blair & Stout, supra note 159, at 326. 
 172 Rock, supra note 13, at 1911. 
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shareholder wealth maximization and allow their managers to consider 
not only the well-being of shareholders and the firm, but also a variety 
of other stakeholder interests. In order to evaluate whether they will 
succeed in doing this, it is necessary to understand the forces that have 
caused the trend toward shareholder primacy in traditional 
corporations. 
1.     Legal Requirements 
a.     State Corporate Law 
Directors of U.S. corporations are charged with managing or 
directing the affairs of the corporation.173 The directors typically appoint 
officers who manage the day-to-day operations of the corporation while 
the directors play a supervisory role. In carrying out this responsibility, 
directors owe a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to both the 
corporation itself and its shareholders.174 Director decisions are 
scrutinized under the very lenient business judgment rule, which 
presumes that the board of directors acted on an informed basis and in 
the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interest of the 
corporation.175 
A debate among scholars and practitioners persists about whether 
directors’ fiduciary duties, which flow to both the corporation and its 
shareholders, include an obligation to maximize shareholder value. 
However, numerous scholars and commentators argue that no such 
legal obligation exists.176 The case most often cited by those who believe 
shareholder primacy is enshrined in law is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.177 
The case was brought by the Dodge brothers, who were minority 
shareholders in Ford Motor Company.178 The Dodge brothers were 
 
 173 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2018). Director duties are substantially, 
but not perfectly, consistent across states. This discussion focuses on Delaware laws because 
most large corporations are incorporated in Delaware. 
 174 See, e.g., Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996). The duty 
of care is the duty to “use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would 
use in similar circumstances.” Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 
1963). It is a duty not to act negligently. The duty of loyalty is a duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest and therefore to always pursue the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, not 
the interests of any director. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 175 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746–47 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 176 See, e.g., MIGUEL PADRÓ, ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, UNREALIZED POTENTIAL: 
MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT CORPORATE PURPOSE AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUSINESS 
EDUCATION (May 28, 2014), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/
docs/pubs/Aspen%20BSP%20Unrealized%20Potential%20May2014v.2.pdf; Einer Elhauge, 
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 783–96 (2005); Lynn 
A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008). 
 177 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 178 Id. at 670–71. 
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displeased by Ford’s recent decision to suspend dividends in order to 
reinvest its profits into the company and thus allow Ford’s success to be 
shared more widely in the community.179 They sued to demand that 
Ford pay the usual dividend.180 The court ordered Ford to pay the 
dividend and commented that “[a] business corporation is organized 
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers 
of the directors are to be employed for that end.”181 
This case has never been overturned and is, therefore, technically 
“good law.”182 Nonetheless, there are many reasons to doubt the 
relevance of this decision and its proclamation that businesses are 
organized solely for the benefit of their shareholders. As Professor Lynn 
Stout pointed out: the case is nearly one hundred years old (and 
therefore preceded the debate between Berle and Dodd about corporate 
responsibility)183; the statement about shareholder primacy is likely 
dicta; the decision turned on the rights of minority shareholders, not 
shareholders generally; and it is the decision of a jurisdiction (Michigan) 
that is not the epicenter of contemporary corporate activity.184 More 
recent cases have stood much more clearly for the proposition that 
corporate directors have flexibility to consider non-shareholder 
interests,185 though there do appear to be limits to how far the courts 
will permit management to de-emphasize shareholder value.186 
 
 179 Id. at 671 (“‘My ambition,’ declared Mr. Ford, ‘is to employ still more men; to spread the 
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their 
lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our profits back into the 
business.’”). 
 180 Id. at 673. 
 181 Id. at 684. 
 182 See, e.g., CLARK, JR. & VRANKA, supra note 106, at 8 (“Dodge v. Ford remains good law 
and many still maintain that its ‘theory of shareholder wealth maximization has been widely 
accepted by courts over an extended period of time.’”); Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an 
Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 190 (2008) (“[T]he rule of 
wealth maximization for shareholders is virtually impossible to enforce as a practical matter.”); 
Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 11, at 608 (“At inception, it appears 
permissible to include charitable or social goals as part of a corporation’s purposes. Yet, 
anecdotal reports suggest that in some states, inclusion of such goals as a major component of 
corporate purposes may stall or block acceptance of articles by the secretary of state.” (footnote 
omitted)); Stout, supra note 176, at 174 (“Not only is Dodge v. Ford bad law from a positive 
perspective, but it is also bad law from a normative perspective.”). 
 183 See supra Section I.A. 
 184 See Stout, supra note 176, at 166–67. 
 185 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (finding 
that directors acted within their fiduciary duties when rejecting a merger that would have 
provided substantial returns to shareholders on the basis that it did not comport with corporate 
strategy); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (finding that 
directors’ defensive measures against a takeover enjoy the protection of the business judgement 
rule when the directors hold a reasonable belief that the transaction is a threat to corporate 
policy and the response is proportionate); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1968) (finding that shareholders did not state a cause of action in claiming mismanagement by 
directors where the directors’ decisions did not hint at fraud, illegality, or a conflict of interest). 
 186 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
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Nonetheless, to the extent there remains some uncertainty about 
when and to what extent corporate managers can consider non-
shareholder interests, it is conceivable that a corporation could find 
itself confronted with a court willing to enforce an affirmative duty to 
maximize shareholder value. However, this scenario seems increasingly 
unlikely, and following the advent of constituency statutes, directors of 
corporations in constituency states are statutorily authorized to consider 
the effects of their decisions on non-shareholder interests.187 The lack of 
a clear legal mandate to maximize shareholder value demonstrates that 
state corporate law is not the driving force behind U.S. corporations’ 
focus on shareholder wealth maximization. 
b.     Other Legal Measures That Encourage Shareholder Primacy 
While state corporation law does not appear to enshrine a 
requirement of shareholder primacy, since the 1990s a variety of federal 
regulations have had the effect of encouraging corporate managers to 
manage corporations in furtherance of shareholder preferences,188 either 
as their explicit goal or as a secondary consequence. Summaries of 
prominent examples follow. 
1992 Proxy Rule Changes. Rule 14a-8 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 requires that companies include shareholder 
proposals in their proxy statements if certain requirements are met.189 
However, some of the communications that shareholders might make in 
discussing potential shareholder proposals among themselves could be 
considered “proxy solicitations” under Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) rules, and thus, be subject to substantial filing 
requirements and restrictions.190 The 1992 reforms limited the types of 
shareholder communications that could be considered proxy 
solicitations, allowing shareholders to more effectively coordinate to 
make shareholder proposals.191 This reform facilitates shareholder 
activism and thereby increases shareholders’ ability to hold 
management accountable. 
 
(distinguishing Paramount by clarifying that corporate culture is not an end automatically 
protected by the business judgment rule, but rather that the judgment that the promotion of a 
non-stockholder interest will eventually lead to stockholder gain is protected by the business 
judgment rule). 
 187 The first state to adopt a constituency statute was Pennsylvania in 1983. Esposito, supra 
note 47, at 660. Notably, Delaware, where sixty-three percent of Fortune 500 firms were 
incorporated in 2014, has no constituency statute. CLARK, JR. & VRANKA, supra note 106, at 9–
10. 
 188 See STOUT, supra note 13, at 111–12. 
 189 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2018). 
 190 See Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms, 16 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 233, 236 (2000). 
 191 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT viii (1993), https://www.sec.gov/
about/annual_report/1992.pdf. 
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1993 Tax Code Changes. Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue 
Code as enacted in 1993 limited the amount of executive pay that was 
deductible against corporate profits to one million dollars for pay not 
tied to performance.192 Stock options were considered performance-
based, and thus, not subject to the limit.193 Executives who are 
compensated in stock options have very strong incentives to manage the 
corporation so as to maximize share price. As has been widely noted in 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial collapse, compensating executives 
with stock options also often creates perverse incentives that allow 
executives to be substantially enriched by share price increases, while 
bearing little to none of the risk of a share price collapse.194 Section 
162(m) was amended by the 2017 Tax Act such that performance-based 
pay will no longer be exempt from the one million dollar deductibility 
limit for tax years beginning after December 31, 2017.195 
2002 Rule on Mutual Fund Voting. In 2002, the SEC adopted rules 
requiring mutual funds and other “management investment companies” 
to publicly disclose how they vote the shares that they hold as well as the 
policies and procedures they use to determine how to vote these 
shares.196 This additional disclosure allows individual investors to 
determine how a mutual fund votes before making a decision whether 
to invest, which would be expected to encourage mutual funds to vote in 
the interests of their investors. While not necessarily the intended effect, 
this rule works to make mutual funds more attuned to share price. 
2010 Elimination of Broker Discretionary Voting. In 2010, New 
York Stock Exchange Rule 452 was amended to prohibit brokers from 
voting shares in director elections when they have not received 
instructions from their customers as to how to vote (uninstructed 
shares). Prior to this amendment, brokers could vote uninstructed 
shares at their discretion. Because brokers usually vote for the board’s 
nominees, this amendment reduced the number of shares voted in favor 
of management, thus increasing the power of votes against 
management.197 
 
 192 Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 14 TAX 
POL’Y & ECON. 1, 3 (2000). 
 193 Id. at 7. 
 194 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear 
Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (2010). 
 195 Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054; I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2017); see 
also The New Tax Rules for Executive Compensation and Employee Benefits, MCGUIREWOODS 
(Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2017/12/New-Tax-
Rules-Executive-Compensation-Employee-Benefits.aspx. 
 196 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Final Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy 
Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, https://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/33-8188.htm (last updated Sept. 23, 2003). 
 197 See WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, WEIL BRIEFING: SEC DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 1–3 (July 9, 2009), http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/Weil_Briefing_SEC_
CG_July_9.pdf. 
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2011 Say on Pay Rules. The “Say on Pay” rules were a result of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and 
require an advisory (non-binding) shareholder vote on compensation 
packages for executives.198 The Say on Pay rules are intended to allow 
shareholders to put management on notice if they are displeased with 
the compensation provided to executives. This rule gives corporate 
executives yet another incentive to please shareholders. 
None of these rules require corporate management to prioritize 
shareholder interests; however, they do incentivize managers to do so. 
They also empower shareholders to act when they are displeased with 
management. These rules demonstrate a concern among policymakers 
about manager-shareholder agency costs and thereby indirectly 
promote share price primacy. While they have likely contributed to the 
trend toward share price primacy, as the next Section will demonstrate, 
they are not the defining force. 
2.     Shareholder Identity Has Changed 
In his article describing the problem of the separation of ownership 
and control as “resolved,” Rock emphasized that the shift to a 
shareholder-centric system of corporate governance has occurred 
primarily through non-legal changes.199 Rather than laws promoting 
shareholder primacy, other forces have caused shifts in the balance of 
power between corporate management (executives and directors) and 
shareholders.200 Recall that agency costs arise in the relationship 
between shareholders and management when shareholders are 
dispersed and passive, thus inhibiting their ability to use their 
shareholder rights to defend their interests. Over the past several 
decades, shareholders have become more concentrated and more active. 
The increased concentration of share ownership is the result of the 
rise of institutional investors. The percentage of institutional holdings of 
publicly traded stock has steadily increased since 1980.201 Because 
institutional investors purchase shares on behalf of a large number of 
individual human investors, their ownership stakes tend to be 
significantly larger than those of individual investors. The result is that 
 
 198 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and 
Golden Parachute Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 2011), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm. 
 199 Rock, supra note 13, at 1910. 
 200 Id. at 1922; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 62, at 995–1007. 
 201 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 62, at 995–98; Serdar Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional 
Investors and Ownership Engagement, 2013 OECD J. 93, https://www.oecd.org/corporate/
Institutional-investors-ownership-engagement.pdf; Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, 
Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships (Aug. 21, 2012) 
(unpublished paper), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2147757. 
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the coordination of a smaller number of shareholders is required for 
successful shareholder advocacy. 
Not only have institutional investors become more prevalent, they 
are also increasingly inclined toward activism. Mutual funds represent 
an increasingly large proportion of institutional investors.202 Mutual 
funds traditionally did not engage in strong investor activism, but this is 
no longer always the case.203 The rise of hedge funds is also a very 
important contributor to the increasing power of shareholders. While 
hedge funds may not be the largest owners of publicly traded shares, 
certain hedge funds are particularly inclined toward engaging in activist 
campaigns to change the business strategies of the corporations in 
which they invest.204 Moreover, pension funds, which do not often 
engage in strong shareholder activism, sometimes affiliate themselves 
with activist hedge funds that do.205 
Concurrent with this rise of institutional investors who are 
concentrated and active, proxy advisory firms have arisen that further 
facilitate investor activism. Proxy advisory firms make 
recommendations to their institutional investor clients about how to 
vote their shares on any number of corporate issues.206 Thus, they assist 
shareholders in coordinating and unifying their votes. 
The trends of increased institutional holdings, more active 
institutional investors, and the rise and assistance of proxy advisory 
firms have converged to create a landscape of share ownership that does 
not look anything like the dispersed, unorganized, and passive 
shareholders described by the extensive scholarship dedicated to agency 
costs and the separation of ownership and control. An important result 
of this development is that active institutional investors may not simply 
be focused on shareholder value generally. Rather, there is evidence to 
suggest that they more specifically tend to focus their activism on 
maximizing short-term shareholder value.207 Institutional investors are 
generally strongly incentivized to purchase shares and increase the share 
price as quickly as possible. They can then either sell the shares at a 
 
 202 See Kahan and Rock, supra note 62, at 998. 
 203 Id. at 1001 (footnote omitted); see also ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra note 171, at 4 (“Presently, 
however, many college savings, 401(k), and related retirement funds engage in behavior that is 
inconsistent with their investors’ goals, as they trade securities, pay their managers, and engage 
in (or support) activism in pursuit of short-term financial objectives at the expense of long-
term performance and careful analysis of fundamental risk.”). 
 204 See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An 
Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the 
Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016); 
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007); Kahan & Rock, supra note 62, at 998. 
 205 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 62, at 1004–05. 
 206 Id. at 1005–06; see also Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 204, at 557–59. 
 207 See STOUT, supra note 13, at 69–71. 
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profit, or report to their clients and potential clients on the successful 
investments they have made, or both.208 Because share prices cannot 
increase infinitely, it is far from clear that this trend is beneficial to the 
long-term interests of the corporation or the economy.209 In recent 
years, some institutional investors have publicly announced that they 
make investments with a long-term focus.210 It is too soon to know the 
force of this trend and how it will affect corporate decision making. 
The rise in active institutional investors has changed the landscape 
of public share ownership such that a fundamental premise on which 
the agency cost analysis is based—dispersed and passive shareholders—
is no longer true. Therefore, this non-legal development is arguably the 
most consequential force that has solved the agency cost problem. 
3.     Human Shareholder Limitations 
A final and important force that drives shareholder primacy is the 
inability of investors to advocate on behalf of outcomes other than 
maximizing share price. The trends discussed so far have overcome 
agency costs associated with maximizing share price, particularly short-
term share price. However, to the extent shareholders would like the 
corporations in which they have invested to pursue other ends, obstacles 
still exist in promoting those other interests. 
Jensen and Meckling based their theory of the firm on a number of 
assumptions, one of which was that “[n]o outside owner gains utility 
from ownership in a firm in any way other than through its effect on his 
wealth or cash flows.”211 This assumption, however, does not accurately 
represent reality. Even where investors are institutional, the investment 
is usually held on behalf of one or more humans. Most of us can likely 
reflect on our experiences being and living among humans to observe 
that humans derive value from other sources besides wealth and cash 
flows. There are both selfish and altruistic dimensions to individual 
investors’ non-share price interests. 
First, humans interact with corporations in many ways other than 
by investing in their stock. “They are also consumers who buy products, 
citizens who pay taxes, and organisms that breathe air and drink 
water.”212 So, if corporations are advancing short-term share price at the 
 
 208 Id. at 66–67. 
 209 Id. at 71–73. 
 210 See, e.g., Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK 
(2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (“As a 
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our clients need to meet their goals.”). 
 211 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 145, at 13. 
 212 STOUT, supra note 13, at 87. 
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expense of engaging in research and development for the products that 
shareholders purchase or protecting the environment in which 
shareholders live, shareholders will be negatively affected by these 
actions. Second, human shareholders often care about corporate actions 
that do not directly affect them. Ample evidence exists to confirm that 
the vast majority of humans are what Professor Lynn Stout referred to 
as “prosocial.”213 This is to say, we are often willing to make modest 
personal sacrifices to be ethical and avoid harming others.214 The 
significant demand among entrepreneurs and investors for a corporate 
form that will allow them to “do well while doing good” is evidence of 
this tendency. 
So, most humans who ultimately own shares in corporations would 
likely be willing, at times, to sacrifice an increase in share price for the 
benefit of other stakeholders—whether or not they are in that “other 
stakeholder” group. In spite of this, as discussed above, modern public 
shareholders narrowly use their increased leverage to promote increases 
in share price and often in the short term at the expense of the long 
term. 
There are a number of factors that combine to create this 
phenomenon. First, institutional investors are fiduciaries for their 
clients, and that fiduciary duty is generally understood to mean that 
these funds are obligated to protect only their clients’ financial 
interests.215 Fund managers therefore have both legal and business 
reasons to prefer a high share price. It fulfills their legal duties to their 
clients, but also demonstrates to existing and future clients that the fund 
is a profitable investment. Second, the same forces that make dispersed 
shareholders passive—lack of information and rational apathy—work to 
make the individuals who invest in mutual and pension funds passive.216 
Individuals invest in funds precisely because they do not want to 
monitor and manage a diverse portfolio of investments. They pay to 
delegate this task to fund managers and thus a new set of “agency costs” 
arises. Most individual investors do not likely consider it cost-effective 
to closely monitor their fund investments. Finally, stock price is an 
easily understood and comparable piece of data. Higher is better, and it 
is reasonable to assume that higher is better for all investors, whether 
individuals or funds. Shareholders’ non-financial preferences are likely 
much more diverse and more difficult to measure. It is therefore much 
more practical for either corporate management or a fund manager to 
focus on the one metric—share price—that will please every 
 
 213 Id. at 96; see also LYNN A. STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE 
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 214 See STOUT, supra note 13, at 96. 
 215 Id. at 91. 
 216 Id. 
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shareholder. 
The result of these forces is that “fund managers have little to lose 
and much to gain from supporting corporate strategies that raise the 
stock prices of the firms they hold in their portfolios, even when those 
same strategies harm their beneficiaries’ outside interests.”217 So, share 
price maximization continues to be pursued even when the individual 
shareholders themselves may have other preferences. 
With these observations in mind, we can clarify that when the 
leaders of the social enterprise movement and the creators of benefit 
corporations say they aim to move away from “shareholder value 
maximization,” what they are really concerned about is share price 
maximization. Because, it turns out, even shareholders in traditional 
corporations place value on outputs that could be considered part of a 
social mission. 
C.     Conclusion 
Several forces have combined to cause publicly traded U.S. 
corporations to be very narrowly focused on maximizing share price. As 
we have seen, state corporation law is not the driving force behind this 
trend. Instead, the growing prominence of institutional investors means 
there are fewer shareholders owning larger shares of corporations. 
Shareholders have been further empowered by federal regulations and 
the advent of proxy advisory services. These changes all work together 
to make it easier for shareholders to overcome the collective action 
problems associated with utilizing shareholder rights to impact 
corporate decision making. Structural and practical limitations cause 
modern shareholders to use this power to promote share price 
maximization at the expense of human shareholders’ more “prosocial” 
concerns. 
IV.     WILL BENEFIT CORPORATIONS OVERCOME SHAREHOLDER 
PRIMACY? 
The explicit goal of benefit corporations is to allow businesses to 
operate in pursuit of social mission by freeing them from the pressures 
to maximize share price. The extent to which they will succeed in doing 
this will depend, first, on the extent to which the forces that have led 
traditional corporations to become narrowly focused on share price will 
similarly impact benefit corporations and, second, whether the benefit 
corporation form will instead allow businesses to operate in a way that 
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effectively provides social return.218 This Part analyzes how those forces 
will affect benefit corporations. 
A.     The Separation of Benefit and Control 
The problem of agency costs arising from the separation of 
corporate ownership and control is premised on the belief, articulated 
by Berle, Friedman, and others, that the proper purpose of a corporation 
is to maximize profits for shareholders.219 You must start with the 
premise that shareholder preferences are the proper focus of corporate 
action in order for the inability of shareholders to control management 
to be a problem. 
As we have seen, benefit corporations do not take this view. 
Instead, benefit corporations make clear that their purpose goes beyond 
maximizing shareholder return.220 They explicitly pledge to pursue 
social mission simultaneously with shareholder financial return. 
With this very clear statement of benefit corporations’ aims, we can 
repurpose the traditional separation of ownership and control analysis 
for benefit corporations by altering the premise to include social 
mission beneficiaries together with shareholders as the proper foci of 
corporate action. Doing this, we have two distinct groups whose 
interests we have decided are the purpose of the benefit corporation. 
Both groups are, to differing extents, separated from the management 
that controls the benefit corporation. 
Using this revised analytic framework, the analysis with respect to 
the shareholders is the same as it was in the traditional analysis of 
corporations. Shareholders have some limited rights, but if they are 
unwilling or unable to coordinate to use their shareholder rights to 
control management, then management may act in ways that are 
contrary to shareholder interests. Applying this analysis to the social 
mission beneficiaries, however, we see that the likelihood that their 
interests will not be adequately protected is even greater. For 
shareholders, the problem arises because they may have difficulty or 
lack incentive to utilize their shareholder rights to control management. 
The beneficiaries have no control rights. If they are receiving inadequate 
or no public benefit, they must rely on the shareholders to be aware of 
the problem, know how to solve it, and take action to protect their 
interests. 
 
 218 See BRAKMAN REISER & DEAN, supra note 10, at 27 (“For a specialized form to be a 
meaningful brand to social enterprise stakeholders, it must convince them to trust that the new 
entity will avoid the problems caused by existing products . . . .”). 
 219 See supra Section III.A. 
 220 See MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 201. 
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Shareholders can overcome the separation of ownership and 
control if they can organize to overcome the collective action problem of 
utilizing their shareholder rights. As we have seen, modern shareholders 
in traditional public corporations have done just that. However, no 
amount of coordination or commitment by beneficiaries will give them 
the power to impact corporate decision making because they have no 
rights to do so. Thus, the separation of benefit and control is a much 
larger obstacle than the separation of ownership and control. 
Shareholders must act as proxies for beneficiaries and they are 
given an additional tool to do this—the benefit enforcement proceeding. 
However, using the benefit enforcement proceeding would be very 
costly, as any litigation is. Using other shareholder rights to pressure 
management would also involve substantial transaction costs and could 
result in a lower financial return on investment for the shareholders. As 
Professor Sarah Dadush describes, this places beneficiaries in the 
“precarious position” of being both the intended beneficiaries of social 
good, but also possible sources of profit for shareholders.221 
Nonetheless, the success of benefit corporations in pursuing their social 
missions will depend on shareholders’ ability not only to engage in 
activism when management action is inadequate, but to do so on behalf 
of the beneficiaries rather than, or in addition to, themselves. 
B.     Evaluating Each Trend That “Solved” the Agency Problem 
1.     Legal Requirements 
Benefit corporation statutes are unequivocal in their intent to 
eliminate any legal requirement that officers and directors focus solely 
on share price. Benefit corporations must state in their articles of 
incorporation that their purpose is to pursue social mission.222 The 
Model Legislation explicitly states that pursuit of social mission is in the 
best interest of the corporation.223 Further, benefit corporation directors 
are obligated to consider the interests of non-shareholder 
stakeholders.224 
Thus, to the extent that managers’ duties under state corporation 
law were a catalyst of corporations’ focus on share price maximization, 
benefit corporations clearly overcome that hurdle. However, as we saw 
above, if corporation law was a contributor to share price maximization 
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at all, it was not a primary or decisive one. Nonetheless, any ambiguity 
in the law creates risk for businesses. So, even if state corporation law 
was not the driving force in the path toward share price primacy, it is 
still of some value to benefit corporations to have eliminated this source 
of ambiguity. 
Most of the federal rules and regulations promoting shareholder 
rights and share price maximization discussed in Section III.B.1.b above 
are not currently relevant for the vast majority of benefit corporations. 
They are primarily directed at publicly traded companies. To date, there 
is only one publicly traded benefit corporation, Laureate Education, 
which completed its initial public offering on February 6, 2017. For 
Laureate and any future publicly traded benefit corporations, the SEC 
rules will likely encourage shareholder activity the same way they do for 
traditional corporations. Whether this increased shareholder activity 
results in social goods to beneficiaries will depend on the extent to 
which shareholders choose to use their influence to promote 
beneficiaries’ interests. However, public shareholders will continue to 
have the option to use their influence to promote their own financial 
interests, which they may do because benefit corporation investors 
expect a financial return. Because we currently have only one example of 
a publicly traded benefit corporation, and Laureate has only been 
trading publicly for just over one year, it is not yet possible to draw 
conclusions about how these rules will affect benefit corporation 
decision making. Moreover, it is not clear whether a trend of publicly 
traded benefit corporations will develop. 
2.     Shareholder Identity 
Likewise, because only one benefit corporation is currently publicly 
traded, information about the ownership composition of all but one 
benefit corporation is not publicly available. Therefore, it is not possible 
to draw conclusions about trends in the composition of investors in 
benefit corporations.225 However, hypotheses based on available 
information are possible. At one end of the private-public spectrum, 
some benefit corporations may exist as small, private, and closely held 
 
 225 As of February 28, 2018, a group of private equity investors who initially purchased 
shares of Laureate in a 2007 leveraged buyout (well before Laureate became a benefit 
corporation) owned a majority of both classes of Laureate’s outstanding stock and controlled 
91.5% of the voting power. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SCHEDULE 14A FOR LAUREATE 
EDUCATION INC. (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912766/0001047469
18002781/a2235277zdef14a.htm. Thus, in the case of Laureate, so long as these investors hold 
their shares, the public investors who purchased shares in the IPO will have substantially 
diminished (if any) power to influence corporate behavior, whether in furtherance of their own 
or the beneficiaries’ interests. 
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companies. In this case, the ability of shareholders to influence 
management will be largely irrelevant because shareholders will be few 
and will often be the same individuals as management. Beyond that 
scenario, benefit corporations may be private companies that seek 
outside equity investors, or even go public as Laureate did. 
A driving force behind the creation of benefit corporations was the 
increasing popularity of socially responsible investing (SRI).226 There 
were $8.72 trillion of assets under management using SRI techniques at 
the start of 2016, accounting for one out of every five dollars under 
professional management in the United States.227 Thus, there is reason 
to believe that benefit corporations that seek external capital will attract 
investments from professionally managed, socially responsible 
investment vehicles. If this is true, then share ownership of benefit 
corporations will be less dispersed than is imagined by the traditional 
separation of ownership and control analysis because investments will 
be made by SRI vehicles that pool individual capital.228 SRI investments 
pursue long-term financial returns,229 so the pressure to create short-
term gains in share price will likely be less for benefit corporations than 
it is for traditional corporations. Beyond that observation, it is difficult 
to know the exact profile of investors in benefit corporations and the 
extent to which any future trends will mirror those observed in 
traditional public corporations. However, given available information it 
is reasonable to predict they will not be entirely dispersed, and will have 
a longer-term focus than traditional public company equity investors. 
The reduced focus on short-term returns should empower benefit 
corporations to further their social missions because management will 
be freed from a focus on short-term results, granting them more leeway 
to pursue social mission even if that sometimes comes at the expense of 
short-term financial gain. The effects of ownership concentration are 
much less clear. This is in part because we do not yet have an accurate 
profile of benefit corporation shareholders, or information about how 
their concentration will develop in the future. 
However, even if we knew exactly what benefit corporation share 
ownership looked like, that information would be insufficient to make 
meaningful predictions about their relative commitments to social 
mission and share price. This is because protection of both these aims 
 
 226 See CLARK, JR. & VRANKA, supra note 106, at 3–4. 
 227 US SIF, REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 2016 
12 (2016), http://www.ussif.org/files/SIF_Trends_16_Executive_Summary(1).pdf. 
 228 Id. at 14 (citing $206 billion AUM in alternative investment vehicles that “include a 
number of private equity funds focused on themes such as clean technology and social 
enterprise, and property funds focused on green building and smart growth”). 
 229 Id. at 12 (“The individuals, institutions, investment companies, money managers and 
financial institutions that practice SRI investing seek to achieve long-term competitive financial 
returns.”). 
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falls to the shareholders. If shareholders are uncoordinated and inactive, 
then neither share price nor social mission will be defended. If 
shareholders are coordinated and active, we cannot be certain how they 
will divide their efforts between promoting share price and promoting 
social mission. Though, the human fallacies described in the next 
Section give reason for doubt that social mission will be adequately 
protected. 
3.     Human Shareholder (and Management) Limitations 
The ability of benefit corporations to create real social good will 
depend heavily on the commitment of their directors, officers, and 
shareholders. As demonstrated above, the intended beneficiaries of 
benefit corporations’ social missions lack any input in the operation of 
the corporation, so the attainment of social mission will depend entirely 
on the commitment of the corporate management in the first instance, 
and then the commitment of shareholders to enforce the social mission 
if management fails to do so. This Section analyzes the extent to which 
we should expect such commitment. 
a.     Management Commitment 
There is reason to believe that directors and officers of benefit 
corporations will have, ex ante, greater commitment to social mission 
than those of traditional corporations. Benefit corporation law ensures 
that directors and officers will be on notice that a purpose of the benefit 
corporation is to pursue public benefit. So, benefit corporation 
managers will be aware of this goal and will ideally only choose to 
manage the corporation if they are committed to pursuing this goal. 
Moreover, initially, many benefit corporations will be managed by their 
founders who explicitly chose the benefit corporation form for their 
enterprise. The founders will likely be significantly committed to social 
mission. As the benefit corporation grows and management changes, 
this commitment could erode. 
Nonetheless, consideration of nonprofit corporation governance 
gives reason to believe that benefit corporation managers may not 
always maintain unwavering commitment to social mission. Like benefit 
corporations, nonprofits also face a separation of benefit and control; 
the intended beneficiaries of nonprofits’ social missions have no legal 
rights to impact decision making in the nonprofit.230 Unlike benefit 
 
 230 Nonprofits do not have shareholders. They may have “members,” which are in many 
ways analogous to shareholders, but the nonprofit may choose who those members are and 
they need not represent the intended beneficiaries. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(4) 
(West 2006) (stating that a Delaware nonstock corporation (the corporate form for Delaware 
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corporations, nonprofits are formed solely for the purpose of pursuing a 
social mission and may not pursue private profit.231 Employees of 
nonprofit corporations are prohibited from being compensated based 
on the profits of the organization,232 and the IRS requires that nonprofit 
executive compensation be “reasonable and not excessive.”233 Managers 
of nonprofit firms are therefore expected to be more altruistic than 
managers of for-profit firms because the possibility of large 
compensation is eliminated, but they are incentivized by the knowledge 
that they are doing good.234 Those seeking large financial compensation 
are disincentivized from managing nonprofit organizations. 
Nonetheless, extensive regulations exist to monitor the acts of nonprofit 
management and ensure that their financial resources are devoted to the 
nonprofit’s mission.235 This extensive regulation would not be necessary 
if nonprofit managers’ altruistic tendencies were sufficient to ensure 
sustained commitment to the nonprofit’s mission. Indeed, nonprofits 
are not infrequently found in violation of these regulations236 and the 
total incidence of such violations is difficult to know given the limited 
enforcement resources available to police nonprofits.237 
 
nonprofits) must have members, but failing to have members will not adversely affect the 
existence of the corporation or the validity of its actions, and stating further that if the nonstock 
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governing body will be deemed to be the members); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 601(a) 
(McKinney 2015) (“A corporation shall have one or more classes of members, or, in the case of 
a charitable corporation, may have no members . . . .”). 
 231 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 232 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) 
(“A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from distributing its 
net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, 
directors, or trustees.”). 
 233 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (2018). 
 234 See Anup Malani & Erick A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 
2017 (2007). 
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TIMES (June 23, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/23/us/ex-united-way-leader-gets-7-
years-for-embezzlement.html (describing conviction of the president of the United Way of 
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Gardiner, Charity’s Former Chief Sentenced to Prison for Fraud, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2014, 9:10 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/charitys-former-chief-sentenced-for-fraud-1406132735 
(describing the conviction of the former executive director of the Metropolitan Council on 
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Benefit corporation managers have no similar restraints on their 
ability to financially benefit from the success of the firm and they also 
lack outside regulation to ensure commitment to social mission. Thus, 
while benefit corporation managers may be committed to social mission 
and derive utility from creating social good, the fact that they can 
potentially increase their financial returns by focusing instead on profit 
can be expected to offset their commitment to social good to some 
degree. This problem of competing incentives is exacerbated by the 
great flexibility granted to benefit corporation management in balancing 
the interests of their shareholder and non-shareholder stakeholders. The 
mandatory “general public benefit”238 is extremely broad, as is the list of 
stakeholder interests that directors must consider.239 Moreover, there is 
no requirement that managers prioritize social mission or non-
shareholder stakeholder interests, and some states expressly state that 
prioritization is not required.240 
The extraordinary flexibility afforded to benefit corporation 
management in determining how to simultaneously consider profit and 
social interests insufficiently distinguishes them from traditional 
corporations.241 It gives them substantial leeway to focus on profit, or 
even their own narrower interests, without running afoul of their legal 
duties. The current benefit corporation structure creates a state of affairs 
that looks like the one that existed before the rise of institutional 
investors and the corresponding empowerment of shareholders—a state 
of affairs that caused scholars to worry that corporate managers were 
serving too many masters.242 Professors Antony Page and Robert A. 
Katz commented on the great leeway afforded to benefit corporation 
boards saying, “[t]he early Berle might have characterized this as 
handing over power, ‘with a pious wish that something nice will come 
 
exempt organizations and its 2013 audit rate of 0.71% of tax exempt organizations); CINDY M. 
LOTT ET AL., URBAN INST., RESEARCH REPORT: STATE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE 
CHARITABLE SECTOR 33 (Sept. 2016), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/
84161/2000925-State-Regulation-and-Enforcement-in-the-Charitable-Sector.pdf (concluding 
that “resources devoted to charities oversight [at the state level] are minuscule compared with 
the oversight they are expected to provide”). 
 238 Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Law does not include this concept and requires 
Delaware PBCs to choose a specific public benefit. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (West 2006). 
 239 See MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, §§ 102, 301(a). 
 240 See Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 12, at 697. 
 241 Id. at 692 (“This generic command to ‘do both’ insufficiently distinguishes specialized 
forms from ordinary for-profit entities.”). Professor Sarah Dadush has written on the dangers 
of “blueprinting” in the social enterprise context, which she defines as “when a new market, 
such as the market for social finance, is created based on a template that is set by an already-
existing market, such as the market for conventional finance.” Dadush, supra note 221, at 173. 
Blueprinting has arguably hindered benefit corporations’ efficacy by borrowing too directly 
from the traditional shareholder-focused corporate structure. Id. at 173–74. 
 242 See supra Section I.A. 
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out of it all.’”243 Past efforts at corporate social responsibility reform 
have failed because they insufficiently resolved how corporate managers 
should simultaneously fulfill legal obligations to multiple 
stakeholders.244 Benefit corporation legislation liberates managers to 
consider a wide array of stakeholder interests, but provides no 
additional guidance on how to manage or prioritize the various groups. 
b.     Shareholder Commitment 
Consistent with the traditional corporate governance structure, the 
enforcement of benefit corporation management’s duties falls to the 
shareholders. They are empowered with all the rights that shareholders 
enjoy in traditional corporations—electing directors, voting on major 
transactions, inspecting books and records, and filing derivative suits.245 
However, distinct from traditional corporations, benefit corporation 
managers are obligated to consider the impact of their actions not only 
on the corporation and its shareholders, but also on an array of other 
stakeholders who are intended to be the beneficiaries of the benefit 
corporation’s social mission.246 The discussion above highlights the 
competing incentives that could diminish a manager’s commitment to 
social mission. If management commitment is insufficient, it then falls 
to the shareholders to enforce this commitment. To empower them to 
do so, benefit corporation shareholders have an additional right to bring 
a “benefit enforcement proceeding” against the corporation if they 
believe the business has failed to pursue or achieve its social mission, 
though to do so, shareholders would incur substantial costs.247 
As noted above, most benefit corporations are currently small 
companies that are privately owned, and therefore their ownership and 
management structures are not publicly available information. In a 
small, privately owned benefit corporation, it may well be the case that 
there is substantial overlap among the officers, directors, and 
shareholders. That is, the founders of the benefit corporation may run 
the company as executives, serve on the board, and own substantial 
proportions of stock. In that scenario, the shareholders cannot be 
effective enforcers of mission because they are the same people as the 
management they are supposed to be monitoring. So as a preliminary 
matter, in small, closely held benefit corporations, where management 
and shareholders are the same individuals, shareholders will not 
effectively enforce commitment to social mission where management’s 
 
 243 Page & Katz, supra note 51, at 1369 (quoting A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate 
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1932)). 
 244 Wells, supra note 2, at 122–23. 
 245 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211–12, 220, 251(c), 327 (West 2006). 
 246 See MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 301. 
 247 Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 12, at 715–16. 
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commitment lags. However, in granting shareholders rights as “social 
mission enforcers,” the Model Legislation clearly contemplates benefit 
corporations seeking equity capital from outside the corporation. 
As discussed in Section III.B.3 above, even in traditional 
corporations, most shareholders do care about outcomes other than 
share price. They care about how corporate actions affect their own lives 
and they are prosocial, meaning that, to an extent, they care about how 
corporate actions affect others. In spite of this, shareholders in 
traditional corporations regularly act to promote share price 
maximization. Much like benefit corporation managers, benefit 
corporation shareholders will be aware that they are investing in an 
entity that counts its social mission among its corporate purposes. It is 
likely that they will often be investors who are specifically seeking to 
invest in organizations with a commitment to the greater good. The 
likely result is that benefit corporation shareholders will have a 
somewhat greater willingness to act to promote non-share price 
outcomes as compared to traditional shareholders.248 
Nonetheless, benefit corporation shareholders will face the same 
obstacles as their traditional counterparts in identifying and measuring 
public benefit.249 They will have the advantage of receiving an annual 
benefit report from management.250 While this report must include 
“[a]n assessment of the overall social and environmental performance of 
the benefit corporation . . . reported against a third-party standard[,]”251 
there is no one standard for measuring public benefit, and the benefit 
corporation is responsible for applying the standard to its own actions. 
The Model Legislation specifically states that no third party needs to 
audit or certify the benefit corporation’s assessment of its social 
performance.252 While profit and share price can always be easily 
measured and compared, social contribution is much more subjective. 
Moreover, an initial study showed that less than ten percent of a sample 
of benefit corporations actually complied with this requirement and 
produced a benefit report.253 It is easy to imagine shareholders being 
satisfied by a situation where profits are high and a minimal level of 
social good is being provided even when sacrificing some amount of 
revenue could result in substantially greater public benefit, especially 
when social mission enforcement is costly. Indeed, evidence suggests 
that benefit corporation shareholders do not even demand compliance 
 
 248 Id. at 716.  
 249 See id. at 716–17. 
 250 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 401(a). 
 251 Id. § 401(a)(2). 
 252 Id. § 401(c) (“Neither the benefit report nor the assessment of the performance of the 
benefit corporation in the benefit report required by subsection (a)(2) needs to be audited or 
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 253 See Murray, supra note 11, at 34–35. 
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with basic reporting requirements on social impact. 
Moreover, while benefit corporation shareholders can be expected 
to have a higher-than-average commitment to social mission, so will the 
managers, as pointed out above. There is no reason to believe that the 
additional social commitment of shareholders will be greater than that 
of officers or directors. If both management and shareholders are, on 
average, equally committed to social mission, it is difficult to see how 
shareholders will be effective enforcers. 
Campaign GM from the 1970s is a telling example of presumably 
socially minded shareholders failing to promote corporate social 
accountability. Inspired by Ralph Nader’s writing about GM’s lax safety 
standards,254 a group of activists purchased shares of GM and put forth 
several shareholder proposals intended to reorient GM’s corporate 
mission toward greater social welfare.255 To counter these proposals, 
GM distributed brochures highlighting the corporation’s existing 
commitment to social involvement.256 Campaign GM’s shareholder 
proposals were decisively rejected by shareholders. A number of socially 
motivated shareholders voted against these proposals, including 
Harvard University, Columbia University, and the Rockefeller and 
Carnegie Foundations.257 These shareholders were presumably investing 
in GM for financial return, but they were also social mission–driven 
organizations. Nonetheless, faced with Campaign GM’s proposals for 
increased social accountability, they declined to vote for additional steps 
to make GM more socially responsible. Thus, in this example, a handful 
of activist shareholders willing to take on the high costs of social 
activism, and a shareholder base that included social mission–driven 
shareholders, was insufficient to overcome the status quo level of 
corporate commitment (or lack thereof) to social responsibility. 
Benefit corporations will face the same obstacles confronted by 
Campaign GM, and they may not have activist shareholders willing to 
incur the costs of an enforcement campaign. Thus, while benefit 
corporation shareholders can be expected to exhibit a greater 
commitment to social mission than traditional shareholders, on balance, 
it is unlikely that that additional commitment will translate into 
meaningful promotion of social mission. 
c.     Lack of Beneficiary Input 
In light of the conflicting interests of benefit corporation managers 
and shareholders described above, the most significant impediment to 
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benefit corporations’ pursuit of social mission is the lack of input from 
the intended beneficiaries of benefit corporations’ social missions.258 As 
noted above, beneficiaries’ separation from “control” is much greater 
than that of shareholders because they have no rights to influence 
corporate action. The lack of input from beneficiaries to hold benefit 
corporations accountable to their commitments will increase the 
likelihood that the benefit corporations and their shareholder 
watchdogs will not prioritize commitment to social mission. Even a 
sincere commitment to doing good is often not sufficient to create that 
good. 
Benefit corporation managers and shareholders can be expected to 
have varying degrees of commitment to social mission. In the seemingly 
likely cases where that commitment level results in a suboptimal level of 
social good, the failure by managers to pursue and shareholders to 
effectively enforce social mission would fall into one of three broad 
categories, listed from most pessimistic to most optimistic: 
1. Managers and shareholders are simply selfish. Managers 
pursue their own interests and shareholders only use their 
shareholder rights to promote their own financial interests. 
2. Managers and shareholders monitor social outcomes but are 
only willing to act to pursue or enforce social mission if it 
would cost them very little. 
3. Managers and shareholders diligently pursue, monitor, and 
enforce social commitment but do so ineffectively because 
they are not aware that the benefit corporation’s mission-
driven actions are not actually producing meaningful social 
good. 
The managers and shareholders of a given benefit corporation 
could fall into more than one of these categories. However, any one of 
these categories or any combination of them would result in a 
suboptimal social return, regardless of the intentions of the managers 
and shareholders. Meaningful input from the benefit corporation’s 
intended beneficiaries, if implemented properly, could improve social 
outcomes in each of these scenarios. 
Beneficiary input would improve social outcomes when managers 
and shareholders are in categories one and two by reducing the “social 
distance” between the beneficiaries and the people who are making 
decisions for the benefit corporation. As noted in Section III.B.3 above, 
 
 258 This problem is exacerbated by the exceedingly broad mandate that benefit corporations 
pursue “general public benefit.” MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 201(a). This level of 
generality makes it nearly impossible to identify who should be benefitting from the benefit 
corporation’s actions. However, for the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that benefit 
corporations choose an identifiable specific beneficiary whom they intend to help through their 
corporate action. 
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the vast majority of humans are to some extent, prosocial. Reducing the 
social distance between people can encourage prosociality. For instance, 
research demonstrates that people are more likely to cooperate with 
each other when they are able to see, speak with, or even just learn the 
names of the people with whom they are asked to cooperate.259 
Particularly relevant to benefit corporations, reducing social distance 
has also been shown to promote “volunteering,” where this term is 
defined as individuals bearing a cost so that a public good can be 
provided.260 People have been shown to be more likely to “volunteer” on 
behalf of others who are socially or psychologically close to them.261 In 
benefit corporations, managers and shareholders are asked to 
“volunteer”262 their efforts on behalf of beneficiaries who are left entirely 
outside of the decision making process. If beneficiaries were involved 
directly in the affairs of the benefit corporation, they would be more 
socially and psychologically close to the managers and shareholders. 
This could increase the willingness of managers and shareholders in 
categories one and two to expend more effort to promote social mission. 
Beneficiary input would similarly improve social outcomes in 
category three because the benefit corporation would quickly become 
aware that its efforts at producing social good were not effective. 
Managers and shareholders in category three are willing to help in spite 
of cost and social distance, but lack adequate information about the 
effectiveness of their efforts. 
A widely publicized example of a category three problem is the 
controversy surrounding TOMS Shoes’ social impact. One of the earliest 
and most well-known social enterprises, TOMS Shoes is a Delaware 
LLC263 with a public commitment to a “one for one” model whereby 
products purchased from TOMS result in the donation of a related 
product or service to people in need. Initially, this was one pair of shoes 
donated for each pair purchased.264 Concerns eventually arose about 
these donations displacing local shoemakers in the communities where 
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the donations are made.265 TOMS responded by sourcing its shoes from 
Haiti.266 Since its founding, TOMS has expanded to offer additional 
products, and thus additional donations, such as a free eye exam for a 
person in need with the purchase of a pair of sunglasses.267 However, 
concerns persist about whether TOMS is really addressing the most 
important needs of the recipients of their donations.268 
Ultimately, a company cannot be certain of how its actions are 
affecting its beneficiaries without the beneficiaries’ input. The sooner 
and more effectively a benefit corporation can receive this input, the 
sooner they can adjust their activities to do more good. This is why 
involving beneficiaries in corporate decision making would both reduce 
social distance and increase social returns.269 A proposal for how benefit 
corporations can effectively receive and use beneficiary input is the topic 
of the next Part. 
V.     A PROPOSED SOLUTION: PUBLIC BENEFIT PLANS 
To ensure benefit corporations effectively pursue their social 
missions and create real social good, they must overcome the separation 
of benefit and control. To do this, the intended beneficiaries of benefit 
corporations’ social missions must have some rights to influence the 
decision making that affects social mission commitment. With such 
rights, control over the provision of social good is no longer entirely 
separate from the beneficiaries who are intended to receive the social 
good, and the resulting agency costs are reduced. 
In developing a theory of social enterprise forms, Professor Dana 
Brakman Reiser argues that in order for any stakeholder (shareholder or 
otherwise) to enforce a social enterprise’s commitment to social mission 
the stakeholder must have three things: (1) access to information about 
the provision of the benefit; (2) rights to challenge the decisions made 
that affect the provision of the benefit; and (3) incentives to use those 
rights to enforce the enterprise’s commitment to the benefit.270 
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The intended beneficiaries of benefit corporations’ social missions 
inherently have the first and third requirements. Beneficiaries know 
better than anyone whether and how well the benefit is being provided. 
Moreover, they need not be given artificial incentives to enforce the 
commitment because they are naturally incentivized by the fact that 
they are the intended recipients of the benefit. Thus, under Professor 
Brakman Reiser’s framework, the only change that needs to be made for 
beneficiaries to effectively enforce commitment is to give them the 
rights to challenge the decisions made that affect the provision of the 
benefit. Benefit corporations can effectively empower beneficiaries to 
challenge decisions about social commitment if they are required to 
work with their beneficiaries to produce an ex ante Public Benefit Plan. 
A broad outline of how a Public Benefit Plan requirement would work is 
presented below. It is followed by a more detailed assessment of the 
advantages of the Plan and several important issues that would benefit 
from further debate and consideration. 
Creation of the Public Benefit Plan. A benefit corporation’s Public 
Benefit Plan would be co-authored by its management and 
representatives of the beneficiary class. It would then be subject to 
shareholder approval. It would lay out either concrete steps that the 
benefit corporation will take or guidelines that it will follow to ensure 
that in the operation of its business, it is contributing adequate social 
good for its beneficiaries. The result should be a Plan that is satisfactory 
to both the benefit corporation and the beneficiary representatives. 
Timing Requirements. The benefit corporation would be required 
to have a Plan in force within a certain time period after incorporation 
as or conversion to a benefit corporation. The Plan would remain in 
force for a set period of time—one to several years—though while the 
Plan is in force, the parties could renegotiate provisions that are not 
working well in practice. At the end of the term, the parties could renew 
or renegotiate the Plan for an additional term, or they could choose not 
to do so if the partnership has not been fruitful. If the Plan is not 
renewed, the benefit corporation would be required to find a new 
beneficiary class or representative and produce a new Public Benefit 
Plan within a set time frame. A failure to have a Plan in place at the 
required times would cause the company to lose its benefit corporation 
status. 
Enforcement. The representative beneficiaries would be entitled to 
some enforcement mechanism if they believe that the benefit 
corporation is not complying with the Plan. Options for such a 
mechanism are discussed in more detail below. 
It is important to note that in order to implement this proposal, it 
will be necessary for benefit corporations to choose a “specific public 
benefit” and not only pursue the “general public benefit” required by the 
Model Legislation. When Delaware implemented its Public Benefit 
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Corporation Law in 2013, it independently introduced this change on 
the reasoning that it would provide more clarity and focus to benefit 
corporation leaders.271 This is a positive development.272 While pursuing 
a general public benefit is admirable, as discussed above, it leaves 
management with too much discretion and blurs the distinction 
between benefit corporations and traditional corporations. Under this 
Public Benefit Plan proposal, benefit corporations would specify a 
specific public benefit and then locate a representative beneficiary of 
that specific social mission to participate in drafting and monitoring the 
Public Benefit Plan. 
A.     Creation of the Public Benefit Plan 
The Public Benefit Plan’s most fundamental contribution is that it 
would drastically reduce the separation of benefit and control because it 
would give beneficiaries a measure of control over corporate decision 
making that affects them. At the same time, it ameliorates an important 
ambiguity that has likely made direct beneficiary involvement 
unattractive to social entrepreneurs to date. 
The most plausible explanation for why non-shareholder 
stakeholders currently do not have governance rights in benefit 
corporations is the risk it would create for the benefit corporation, its 
management, and potentially its shareholders.273 If beneficiaries were 
 
 271 See J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit 
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 355 (2014). The Delaware statute requires that the 
specific public benefit be pursued, but that it be balanced against stockholders’ pecuniary 
interests and the interests of those affected by the benefit corporation’s conduct. DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (West 2006) (“The board of directors shall manage or direct the business 
and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests 
of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, 
and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.”). 
The social purpose corporation, which is an alternate social enterprise corporate form adopted 
by a few states, also requires that the corporation choose one or more specific purposes to 
pursue. See BRAKMAN REISER & DEAN, supra note 10, at 64–65. 
 272 See Murray, supra note 271, at 356 (“[R]equiring PBCs to identify a specific public 
benefit purpose is a positive change, which will likely aid directors in decision-making and may 
allow shareholders and courts to create some level of accountability for directors.”). 
 273 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 89, 128 (2015) (“[T]here are risks in granting enforcement rights to non-stockholder 
stakeholders. Stakeholders consist of heterogeneous groups with their own agendas to advance. 
For example, employees’ interests in living wages and health benefits may be in conflict with 
customers’ interests in keeping prices low. Each stakeholder group will have their own agendas 
to advance. The directors of a hybrid corporation must carefully consider whether to grant 
enforcement proceeding rights to representatives from all or particular groups of 
stakeholders.”). Nonetheless, some scholars are continuing to work on formulating ways to 
make stakeholder representation on governance boards work. See generally Dadush, supra note 
221, at 218 (discussing the implementation of a “social director”); Murray, supra note 70, at 64 
(discussing the creation of stakeholder advisory boards). 
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granted governance rights that conveyed real, meaningful power to 
influence corporate decision making, they might do so in a way that 
negatively affects or displeases the benefit corporation’s leaders or 
shareholders.274 Because the benefit corporation statutory language is 
very broad and the fiduciary duties of benefit corporation managers 
have not been addressed in court, substantial ambiguity exists about the 
extent to which benefit corporation management must work to pursue 
social mission. If beneficiaries were empowered to initiate benefit 
enforcement proceedings, this ambiguity would create a great deal of 
risk of litigation by either disgruntled or opportunistic beneficiaries.275 
If, instead, the beneficiaries’ governance rights are more cosmetic, they 
would not be effective in improving social outcomes. With these 
considerations in mind, it is unsurprising that social entrepreneurs have 
not been eager to put forth requirements that beneficiaries be directly 
involved in day-to-day governance or enforcement of mission. 
The Public Benefit Plan proposal ameliorates this concern because 
it forces management and the beneficiaries to elucidate their mutual 
expectations ex ante, reducing the likelihood of unforeseen conflict in 
the future.276 While benefit corporation leaders may lack clear statutory 
language or common law precedent to clarify exactly what their duties 
to beneficiaries are, they can provide that clarity privately by creating a 
Public Benefit Plan that lays out both parties’ expectations. Moreover, 
the Plan would not be mutually exclusive with beneficiary 
representation on the board or as shareholders. So, while the Public 
Benefit Plan allows for beneficiary input without granting day-to-day 
governance rights to beneficiaries, it also does not foreclose the 
possibility of simultaneously granting beneficiaries additional rights. 
In addition to providing clarity about management’s obligations, 
the Public Benefit Plan would also resolve the challenges that benefit 
corporations have faced in measuring their social impact. The Model 
Legislation requires that benefit corporations report on the ways in 
which they have pursued their social mission, and the extent to which 
they succeeded in providing social good.277 However, social enterprise 
scholars have highlighted the weaknesses of benefit corporations’ 
current reporting requirements, pointing to the lack of an objective 
 
 274 See Murray, supra note 70, at 89 (acknowledging that having stakeholder interests 
represented directly on the board “may cause internal discord and fighting among the firms’ 
directors.”). 
 275 Id. at 84 (“Individual stakeholder enforcement rights, however, could lead to excessively 
expensive litigation and could disrupt the functioning of firms by encouraging peripheral 
stakeholders to adopt an adversarial stance against their firms.”). 
 276 Admittedly, the Plan would not eliminate the possibility of future conflicts. However, as 
transactional attorneys are well aware, while a written agreement may never represent an 
ironclad “meeting of the minds,” a thoughtful written agreement provides a great deal more 
certainty than an unwritten “understanding” between parties. 
 277 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 401(a). 
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standard to measure social good.278 Moreover, the sheer diversity of 
social missions that benefit corporations may pursue exacerbates the 
challenge of developing an adequate standard. The Public Benefit Plan 
could serve as a metric, customized to the particular benefit corporation, 
against which the benefit corporation and its various stakeholders could 
measure its success. Benefit corporations could report on the extent to 
which they have met the goals of their Public Benefit Plans. 
Shareholders and other observers would then review the report with 
increased confidence that the goals set forth are ones that are valued by 
the beneficiaries. 
An important question that warrants further discussion is who 
would constitute an adequate beneficiary representative? This question 
would be particularly difficult where the social mission involves the 
environment. In that case, a representative from an environmental 
organization would likely need to be involved. Where the intended 
beneficiaries are human, further consideration is required as to how to 
define “representative” and whether a nonprofit serving the 
beneficiaries’ interests would suffice. A tension arises in considering this 
question between accountability and social distance. A nonprofit would 
have the benefit of both institutionalized processes for providing and 
measuring social benefits, and a legal purpose and obligation to pursue 
those benefits. Nonetheless, inserting another intermediary between the 
beneficiaries and the benefit corporation increases social distance and 
could make the benefit corporation less aware of the ultimate effect of 
its actions on its intended beneficiaries. Choosing one or more 
individual beneficiaries as representatives would substantially reduce or 
eliminate social distance. However, the selected individuals may not be 
able to adequately represent the entire group, and could be more 
susceptible to information asymmetries and influence by the benefit 
corporation’s preferences. Fortunately, scholars have already given 
attention to this question, pointing out the need for a contextual 
analysis depending on the benefit provided.279 
 
 278 See, e.g., Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 11, at 617 (“[T]he delegation 
to third-party standard-setters to vet this public benefit and the lack of a statutory floor for 
what counts as public benefit make low standards and greenwashing particular concerns for the 
benefit corporation.”); Murray, supra note 11, at 48 (“[T]he benefit reporting requirements are 
quite general and vague, merely requiring a narrative description of the ways the public benefit 
was pursued, created, and hindered.”). 
 279 See Plerhoples, supra note 273, at 128 (“Who comprises the group of stakeholders would 
be entirely context dependent. The stakeholders empowered with enforcement rights might be 
the individual, community, or nonprofit beneficiaries that the social enterprise seeks to help. 
Directors might also look outside of stakeholder groups to subject-matter experts, such as 
representatives of independent nonprofits working in the same field.”); see also Murray, supra 
note 70, at 99 (“[R]epresentatives could be nominated and elected by the groups they represent. 
Employees or customers could elect community and environmental representatives, or one or 
more appropriate nonprofits could provide an identifiable voting group.”); BRAKMAN REISER & 
DEAN, supra note 10, at 41 (describing the role of charities in their proposed “Mission 
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B.     Timing Requirements 
Mandating strict timing requirements for having a Plan in place, 
coupled with the automatic forfeiture of benefit corporation status, 
serve to improve beneficiaries’ bargaining power while requiring very 
limited additional government oversight.280 
Without a requirement that benefit corporations always have a 
Plan in place, beneficiaries would have very little, if any, bargaining 
power in drafting the Plan because they are essentially receiving free 
benefits from the benefit corporation. However, it would be costly and 
inconvenient for the benefit corporation if negotiations broke down and 
they had to identify new representative beneficiaries and negotiate a 
new Plan before the deadline to have one in place. Once the benefit 
corporation has identified its representative beneficiaries and begun 
negotiations, they have sunk costs in the process and are incentivized to 
bargain meaningfully with the beneficiaries for a mutually beneficial 
Plan. Moreover, a breakdown of negotiations very close to the deadline 
would put the benefit corporation at risk of losing its benefit 
corporation status. Status as a benefit corporation is presumably 
meaningful to a company that chooses that form over the traditional 
corporate form, and therefore, loss of the status can be expected to serve 
as a deterrent. 
Moreover, benefit corporation statutes have been widely adopted 
by state legislatures in large part because they impose no additional 
costs on the government.281 Some commentators have proposed 
government oversight of benefit corporations, but simultaneously 
acknowledge that this route to improved enforcement is not feasible 
because states do not have the additional resources to devote to a new 
regulatory role.282 The Public Benefit Plan is an enforcement mechanism 
that imposes very minimal additional costs on the government and 
should therefore not substantially interfere with states’ enthusiasm for 
making this entity available to social entrepreneurs. 
The automatic forfeiture of benefit corporation status raises 
important questions about how best to protect shareholders’ rights to 
avoid this result. The Model Legislation consciously sets a high bar to 
abandon a company’s benefit corporation status, requiring a two-thirds 
 
Protected Hybrid” organizations). 
 280 This method has seen some success in the United Kingdom, where the government 
regulator of Community Interest Corporations (CIC) regularly removes organizations from the 
CIC register for failure to file. See Dadush, supra note 221, at 160–61. 
 281 See Haskell Murray, Benefit Corporations: What Am I Missing—Seriously?, LPB 
NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Feb. 23, 2015, 1:16 PM), http://www.lawprofessors.typepad.com/
business_law/2015/02/benefit-corporations-what-am-i-missing-seriously.html. 
 282 Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 12, at 720–22; see also Plerhoples, supra 
note 11, at 566–68. 
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supermajority shareholder vote to terminate benefit corporation 
status.283 Automatic forfeiture of benefit corporation status for failure to 
comply with the Public Benefit Plan requirements would, in effect, allow 
management to terminate benefit corporation status without the 
requisite shareholder vote. Further consideration is required to devise 
adequate rights or remedies for shareholders to avoid this outcome. 
C.     Enforcement 
Another key question for further discussion is how beneficiaries 
will be empowered to enforce the terms of the Plan. 
The first step in enforcement is enforcing the requirement that the 
benefit corporation engage beneficiaries to create the Plan. Evidence 
collected to date indicates that benefit corporation shareholders do not 
effectively enforce the obligation to prepare thorough annual benefit 
reports,284 so they cannot be expected to enforce the obligation to 
prepare a Public Benefit Plan. It will therefore likely be necessary to 
require that the Public Benefit Plan be filed with a state authority since 
benefit corporation shareholders have demonstrated very little will to 
enforce benefit corporations’ existing reporting requirements. 
Nonetheless, the state’s role could be limited to ensuring that it is 
faithfully prepared and filed in a timely manner. 
Once the Plan is in place, the beneficiaries would be empowered to 
monitor compliance with the Plan. If the beneficiaries do not believe the 
Plan is being adequately implemented and the benefit corporation fails 
to remedy the situation, several possible enforcement mechanisms 
warrant discussion: 
1. The beneficiaries could simply be entitled to walk away if 
they are displeased, either during the term of the Plan or at 
the end of the term. This would impose costs on the benefit 
corporation because they would be required to find new 
beneficiary representatives within a statutorily mandated 
time frame or risk losing their benefit corporation status. 
2. The Public Benefit Plan could be an enforceable contract, and 
the beneficiaries would therefore have a right to sue to 
enforce its terms. This would likely only be effective if the 
beneficiary representative were an organization, as 
individuals would often lack the resources to bring such a 
suit. 
3. Under the existing framework, shareholders would have the 
right to bring a benefit enforcement action in the event the 
 
 283 MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 8, § 105(a). 
 284 See Murray, supra note 11, at 44. 
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beneficiaries are not satisfied with the relationship. It is worth 
further consideration whether the beneficiaries themselves 
should also have this right, but with the realm of possible 
claims limited to a failure to abide by the Plan. 
For the second and third options, additional consideration is 
required as to the remedies available to the beneficiaries. Injunctive 
relief would appear a judicious option as the goal of this proposal is to 
ensure that benefit corporations do, in fact, act in a way that provides 
social good. Thus, a remedy that forces them to take such actions seems 
particularly fitting. Large monetary rewards should be avoided in this 
instance because, again, the goal is to influence the actions of benefit 
corporations so that they provide meaningful social good. Financially 
strained or bankrupt benefit corporations will not be able to provide 
social good.285 Nonetheless, fee-shifting of the beneficiaries’ legal costs, 
or the reimbursement of clear, measurable costs to the beneficiaries 
seem appropriate. 
D.     Concluding Thoughts: In Furtherance of the Relevance of 
Benefit Corporations 
This Article seeks only to present the broad outline of the Public 
Benefit Plan as a starting point for further discussion. The description 
above highlights several substantial issues that will need to be resolved 
before this proposal could be functional, though it offers several options 
for resolving each. Further discussion and consideration of this proposal 
would surely bring forth additional questions and ideas, and the ensuing 
discussions would serve to improve and strengthen the proposal. 
Moreover, individual states would be free to implement a Public Benefit 
Plan requirement in the manner they think will be most effective, and 
states could thereby act as laboratories to test different formulations of 
the Public Benefit Plan requirement. Nonetheless, in spite of its 
preliminary status, this proposal has the potential to increase benefit 
corporations’ effectiveness and therefore their long-term relevance. 
Benefit corporations exist because of a desire to create businesses 
that deliver real positive social contributions. If they cannot do this, the 
purpose of the entity disappears. Engaging benefit corporations directly 
with their intended beneficiaries reduces the social distance between the 
benefit corporation and those they aim to serve, which will increase 
accountability and efficacy. Feedback directly from beneficiaries will 
provide the benefit corporation with a direct and accurate evaluation of 
their success that cannot be matched by third party enforcers. 
 
 285 See BRAKMAN REISER & DEAN, supra note 10, at 46 (describing the many reasons that 
stakeholders have to avoid litigation). 
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Requiring a Public Benefit Plan would undoubtedly place 
additional burdens on benefit corporation managers, but this additional 
burden would serve as a useful screen to ensure that those choosing to 
operate benefit corporations have sufficient willingness to do the work 
required to balance social mission and financial return. If a minority of 
benefit corporation states requires the Plan, prospective benefit 
corporation leaders may forum shop and incorporate in a jurisdiction 
that does not require the Plan. Similarly, under the current proposal, a 
benefit corporation that was not willing to devote resources to meeting 
the Plan requirements could let the Plan lapse and revert to a traditional 
corporation, thereby abandoning its benefit corporation status. 
However, these opportunities for managers to avoid the Plan 
requirement are a strength rather than a weakness of the proposal. 
Business leaders who are unwilling to engage with their beneficiaries to 
ensure they are accomplishing their social missions are unlikely to 
exhibit the necessary level of commitment to actually provide 
meaningful social benefit. The long-term relevance of benefit 
corporations depends on their ability to produce real social returns and 
thus distinguish themselves from traditional corporations. If benefit 
corporations are managed by people unwilling to commit to ensuring 
they are providing social returns, they will not do so. Therefore, 
requiring beneficiary input via a Public Benefit Plan will increase the 
likelihood that benefit corporations succeed in their goals and persist as 
a relevant and effective form of social enterprise. 
CONCLUSION 
The creation of benefit corporations is an important and admirable 
experiment in creating businesses committed to doing good and 
avoiding the negative social effects of share price primacy. It is the 
product of the first successful effort to amend state corporation law to 
include a governance framework intended to promote corporate social 
responsibility. Because it is a meaningful legal innovation, it is 
worthwhile to closely examine the structure and ensure it has the 
maximum beneficial effect and that it survives as an entity that 
distinguishes itself from traditional corporations by its successful 
promotion and accomplishment of social mission. 
The incremental nature of the benefit corporation form has 
assisted it in becoming the most popular dual-purpose entity available 
to social entrepreneurs, but it also results in a structure that is unlikely 
to ensure meaningful commitment to and accomplishment of social 
mission. Benefit corporations rely heavily on shareholders to enforce 
their commitment to social mission, which is counterintuitive given 
benefit corporations’ stated aim to overcome shareholder primacy. 
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Benefit corporation shareholders will face many of the same 
impediments to socially beneficial action that traditional shareholders 
face, and the intended beneficiaries of the social mission created by the 
benefit corporation are left out of the decision making process. 
Benefit corporations will be more likely to succeed in producing 
substantial social good if they require participation by beneficiaries in 
corporate decision making. Beneficiaries can effectively be involved in 
corporate decision making, at little to no additional cost to the 
government, through their role in developing and monitoring a Public 
Benefit Plan. This arrangement will usefully clarify the expectations of 
both the benefit corporation and its beneficiaries with respect to how 
and to what extent the benefit corporation will pursue social mission. It 
will reduce the social distance between the benefit corporation and its 
beneficiaries, and therefore result in the more effective provision of 
social benefits. 
